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The Irrelevance of Prisoner Fault for
Excessively Delayed Executions
Russell L. Christopher*
Abstract
Are decades-long delays between sentencing and execution
immune from Eighth Amendment violation because they are selfinflicted by prisoners, or is such prisoner fault for delays simply
irrelevant to whether a state-imposed punishment is cruel and
unusual? Typically finding delay to be the state’s responsibility,
Justices Breyer and Stevens argue that execution following
upwards of forty years of death row incarceration is
unconstitutional. Nearly every lower court disagrees, reasoning
that prisoners have the choice of pursuing appellate and collateral
review (with the delay that entails) or crafting the perfect remedy
to any delay by submitting, as Justice Thomas has invited
complaining prisoners to do, to execution. By choosing the former,
any resulting delay is self-inflicted; delayed executions are
prisoners’ own fault. Despite this argument’s commonsense
appeal, left unexplained is how prisoner fault inoculates stateimposed punishment from Eighth Amendment violation. Lacking
a rationale for the prisoner fault argument, this Article proposes
the two most obvious candidates: (i) analogizing to fault
attribution for delays in the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
context; and (ii) choosing post-conviction review rather than
submitting to execution, prisoners waive Eighth Amendment
challenge of the resulting delay. But neither is persuasive;
moreover, each proposed rationale presupposes the existence of the
very right that Justice Thomas and nearly every court vigorously
deny: an Eighth Amendment right against excessively delayed
* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. Thanks to Lyn
Entzeroth, Stephen Galoob, Ken Levy, Brent Newton, Peter Oh, and Eric
Reynolds for their helpful comments on a previous version of this Article.
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execution. The absence of a persuasive rationale exposes prisoner
fault as irrelevant and removes the primary obstacle to courts
recognizing that execution following decades of death row
incarceration constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
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I. Introduction
How long of a delay between sentencing and execution is too
long before it violates the Eighth Amendment?1 How many years
of death row incarceration are too many before a subsequent
execution would be cruel and unusual punishment? Neither the
nationwide average of nearly sixteen years2 nor the average of
twenty-five years in the two leading death penalty states3 is
enough. Not even individual instances exceeding thirty4 and
nearing forty years suffice.5 Apparently, no length of delay and no
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
2. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT,
2012—STATISTICAL
TABLES,
14
tbl.10
(2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cp12st.pdf [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICS
2012].
3. By number of persons on death row, California (712) and Florida (403)
are the two leading death penalty states. Id. at 18 tbl.15. In California, postsentencing delays “exceed[] 25 years on average.” Jones v. Chappell, No. CV 0902158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at *12 (C.D. Cal. 2014). According to Justice
Kennedy, “[t]he last ten people Florida has executed have spent an average of
24.9 years on death row.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 46, Hall v. Florida,
134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014) (No. 12-10882).
4. See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (commenting on thirty-three years of death row
incarceration).
5. See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). The prisoner, aka Thomas Knight, received
his death sentence in 1975. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999) (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Therefore, he had been incarcerated on
death row for thirty-nine years. Far from being an isolated instance, over 200
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duration of incarceration are too long according to the principal
argument supporting the constitutionality of execution following
decades of death row incarceration.6 According to this argument,
delays between sentencing and execution are the prisoners’ fault.7
As such, they cannot violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment regardless of the length of
delay and duration of incarceration.8 Under this argument,
execution following four decades (or conceivably more) of death
row incarceration is no more troubling to the Eighth Amendment
than execution delayed by one decade or one year.9 This Article
contends, however, that prisoner fault lacks an underlying
rationale related to the concerns of the Eighth Amendment and
thus should be irrelevant in assessing the constitutionality of
excessively delayed executions. Neutralizing the prisoner fault
argument removes the primary obstacle to recognizing that
execution following upwards of thirty years or more of death row
incarceration is cruel and unusual punishment.10
The most important articulation of the prisoner fault
argument is from Justice Clarence Thomas: a prisoner cannot
“avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral
prisoners have been on death row for thirty to forty years. DOJ STATISTICS 2012,
supra note 2, at 18 tbl.15 (stating that thirty-three current death row prisoners
were placed there from 1974 to 1979, sixty from 1980 to 1982, and 121 from
1983 to 1985).
6. See infra Part II (providing a discussion of the prisoner fault
argument).
7. For the first articulation of this argument by a Supreme Court Justice,
see infra text accompanying note 11 and infra Part II.A.
8. See Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (“It is incongruous to arm capital
defendants with an arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they may delay
their executions, and simultaneously to complain when executions are
inevitably delayed.”).
9. See infra Part II (discussing the prisoner fault argument in greater
detail).
10. See Jones v. Chappell, No. CV 09-02158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at *11
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014) (identifying “that the delay is caused by the petitioner
himself, and therefore cannot be constitutionally problematic” as one of the two
principal arguments used by courts denying claims of excessively delayed
executions); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A
Century of Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 682 (2010)
(characterizing the prisoner fault argument as an “obvious difficult[y]” for
prisoners claiming the unconstitutionality of excessively delayed executions).
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procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed.”11
That is, prisoners have the choice of pursuing appellate and
collateral review of their death sentence or simply submitting, as
Justice Thomas has invited complaining prisoners to do, to
execution.12 Choosing the latter forecloses delay. Choosing the
former entails delay between sentence and execution and
prolongation of death row incarceration. Because they have
chosen, in effect, delay and because their actions have caused
delay, the resulting delay is prisoners’ own fault.13 As prisoners’
own fault, delayed executions cannot violate the Eighth
Amendment.14
To place the prisoner fault argument in context requires a
brief account of the origin of the modern debate on the Supreme
Court as to the constitutionality of execution following lengthy
terms of death row incarceration. In 1995, in Lackey v. Texas,15
Clarence Lackey petitioned the Supreme Court claiming that his
execution following seventeen years of death row incarceration
was unconstitutional.16 Brent Newton, counsel for Lackey,
explained the two components of Lackey’s claim, as follows:
“[F]irst . . . execution after keeping Lackey under the extreme
conditions of death row for such a lengthy period of time would
exact more punishment than . . . the Eighth Amendment
[allowed]; and second, neither of the state’s primary interests . . .
—retribution
and
deterrence—would
be
meaningfully
served . . . after such a lengthy delay . . . .”17 According to Newton,
each component asserted that Lackey’s execution would be
disproportionate and thus cruel and unusual in violation of the
11. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999).
12. See Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and
uncertainties’ by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to
deserve: execution.” (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari))).
13. See infra Part II (providing analysis of the prisoner fault argument).
14. See infra Part II (discussing the prisoner fault argument).
15. 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).
16. See id. (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (stating that
petitioner’s claim, “[t]hough novel, . . . is not without foundation”).
17. Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 54–55 (2012).
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Eighth Amendment.18 Newton emphasized that the delay was
“primarily attributable to the state and not to Lackey.”19 Justice
John Paul Stevens wrote a memorandum respecting the Court’s
denial of certiorari stating that the “petitioner’s claim is not
without foundation.”20 Though he found the “importance and
novelty” of the claim “sufficient to warrant review by this Court,”
he maintained that the issue would benefit from further
development and invited lower courts to address it.21 Justice
Stephen Breyer simply noted his agreement with Justice Stevens
“that the issue is an important undecided one.”22
Subsequently, numerous death row prisoners filed “Lackey
claim”23 petitions with the Court, arguing that execution
following lengthy periods of death row incarceration violated the
Eighth Amendment.24 Though all of these petitions for certiorari
18. Id.
19. Id. at 55.
20. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
21. See id. (noting that the factors that made Lackey’s case “sufficient to
warrant review” also simultaneously served as a “principled basis for postponing
consideration of the issue until after it ha[d] been addressed by other courts”).
22. Id. at 1047.
23. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. 2002) (“This claim [of
substantially delayed execution] has become known as a Lackey claim.”); Bryan
A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 699, 762 (2002) (“[T]he claim of
inordinate delay of execution [is] commonly known as a ‘Lackey claim.’”).
24. See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (denying
application for stay of execution of sentence of death); Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct.
1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (evaluating petitioner’s application for stay of
execution “for a crime for which he was initially sentenced to death more than
33 years ago”); Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) (evaluating
claim by petitioner who had “been confined to a solitary cell, awaiting his
execution for nearly 29 years”); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1115 (2009)
(“As [petitioner] awaits execution, petitioner has endured especially severe
conditions of confinement, spending up to 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by
9-foot cell . . . . The dehumanizing effects of such treatment are undeniable.”);
Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (declining
certiorari where petitioner argues “that the Federal Constitution’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments forbids his execution more than 30
years after he was initially convicted”); Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 1140
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (denying stay of execution of petitioner, who is “76
years old, is blind, suffers from diabetes, is confined to a wheelchair, and has
been on death row for 23 years”); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991 (2002)
(denying certiorari where petitioner had “spent more than 27 years in prison
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were denied by the Court, they often drew responses from Justice
Stevens, Justice Breyer, or Justice Clarence Thomas, or some
combination thereof.25 Justice Stevens found merit in two of the
petitions,26 and emphasized that denial of certiorari “does not
constitute a ruling on the merits” in two others.27 Justice Breyer
dissented to the denial of certiorari of eight petitions,28 and joined
since his initial sentence of death”); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 994 (1999)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (considering the Eighth Amendment claim of petitioner
sentenced to death nearly twenty-five years prior); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S.
944, 944 (1998) (evaluating petition for certiorari of prisoner who had been
awaiting execution for over twenty-three years).
25. See cases cited infra note 28 (demonstrating the significant trend of
Breyer dissenting to the denials of certiorari for these petitions and Thomas
separately concurring with the denials).
26. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) (noting that the petitioner “bears little, if any,
responsibility for his delay”); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1114 (2009)
(Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari) (observing that petitioner’s delay
was longer than prior cases where Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer “noted
that substantially delayed executions arguably violate the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment”).
27. Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari).
28. See Muhammad v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 894, 894 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“I would grant the application for stay of
execution and the petition for certiorari limited to the Lackey claim.”); Valle v.
Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“I
have little doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of incarceration [over
thirty-three years] under sentence of death.”); Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1119
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“Here, petitioner has been on
death row for 32 years, well over half his life. For the reasons we have set forth
in the past and for many of those added in Justice Stevens’ separate statement,
I would grant this petition.”); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 985 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that a delay of
execution for over thirty years is clearly “unusual” and “cruel”); Allen v.
Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 1136 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (stating that he would grant petitioner’s stay of execution because the
petitioner “raises a significant question as to whether this execution would
constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishmen[t]’”); Foster, 537 U.S. at 991 (Breyer,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[A]s . . . I have previously pointed out,
the combination of uncertainty in the execution and long delay is arguably
‘cruel.’ This Court has recognized that such a combination can inflict ‘horrible
feelings’ and ‘an immense mental anxiety amounting to a great increase of the
offender’s punishment.’”); Knight, 528 U.S. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (“Where a delay, measured in decades, reflects the State’s
own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim that time has
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Justice Stevens in one other.29 Justice Thomas wrote concurring
memorandums to the denial of certiorari of four petitions.30 The
responses from these Justices to the denial of certiorari of Lackey
claims comprise a spirited debate with Justices Breyer and
Stevens arguing that execution following lengthy terms of death
row incarceration violated the Eighth Amendment and Justice
Thomas forcefully disagreeing.31
Leading capital punishment scholars Carol and Jordan
Steiker have pondered the curious state of the battle over the
Lackey claim.32 They asked, how could a claim be powerful
enough to sustain the attention and commitment of two Supreme
Court Justices for nearly two decades yet so unpersuasive as to
garner the agreement of not a single lower court?33 Steiker and
Steiker answered that the most “obvious difficult[y]” with the

rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one. I believe this
Court should consider that claim now.”); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that “not only has
[petitioner], in prison, faced the threat of death for nearly a generation, but he
has experienced that delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures and not
because of frivolous appeals on his own part”).
29. Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067.
30. See id. at 1071 (stating that there is no constitutional support for this
“novel” Eight Amendment argument); Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117 (claiming
that “[i]t makes ‘a mockery of our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer,
who, through his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured the almostindefinite postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the almost-indefinite
postponement renders his sentence unconstitutional.’” (quoting Turner v. Jabe,
58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring))); Foster, 537 U.S. at
990–91 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (asserting that the
Court’s constitutional jurisprudence had not been altered since he last wrote on
this topic, and therefore, this Eighth Amendment argument still has no
grounding in the Constitution); Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (“Ironically, the neoteric
Eighth Amendment claim proposed by Justice Breyer would further prolong
collateral review by giving virtually every capital prisoner yet another ground
on which to challenge and delay his execution.”).
31. See sources cited supra notes 26–30.
32. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 681 (“What should we make of
the repeated, unsuccessful efforts to bring the Lackey claim before the
Court . . . ?”).
33. See id. (“The claim clearly has enough staying power to command the
sustained attention of members of the Court, and yet has not been embraced by
any lower courts . . . .”).
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Lackey claim is the prisoner fault argument.34 They suggested
two different types of solution.
The first type of solution is “focusing on delays wholly or
mostly attributable to the state.”35 Adopting this approach, Jones
v. Chappell,36 in July 2014, became the first federal decision
recognizing a Lackey claim.37 Finding excessive systemic delays
between sentencing and execution, Jones ruled that California’s
death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment.38 The court reasoned that
among the hundreds placed on death row, the selection of the
random few death row prisoners who would actually be executed
(rather than die of old age) was “arbitrary.”39 In addition, the
decades-long delay “deprive[s the death penalty] of any deterrent
or retributive effect it might once have had. Such an outcome is
antithetical to any civilized notion of just punishment.”40
Rejecting the prisoner fault argument, Jones concluded that the
factual premise of the argument was “simply incorrect.”41 The
court stated, “[t]hese delays—exceeding 25 years on average—are
inherent to California’s dysfunctional death penalty system, not
the result of individual inmates’ delay tactics, except perhaps in
isolated cases.”42

34. See id. at 682.
35. Id.
36. No. CV09-02158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014).
37. See id. at *14 (“Inordinate . . . delay . . . has resulted in a system that
serves no penological purpose. Such a system is unconstitutional.”).
38. See id. at *1 (claiming that the systemic delays have “made [convictee’s]
execution so unlikely that the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed
by the jury has been quietly transformed into one no rational jury or legislature
could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote possibility of death”).
39. See id. at *9 (“The Eighth Amendment simply cannot be read to
proscribe a state from randomly selecting which few members of its criminal
population it will sentence to death, but to allow that same state to randomly
select which trivial few of those condemned it will actually execute.”).
40. Id.
41. See id. at *11 (remarking that the prisoner fault explanation does not
stand to reason, “at least as to California’s administration of its death penalty
system”).
42. Id. at *12.
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In addition to Jones, focusing on delays attributable to the
state is also the approach taken by most Lackey claimants, and,
to some extent, by Justices Breyer and Stevens.43 But apart from
Jones, this approach has uniformly failed because of
disagreements as to the attribution of delay.44 Where Justices
Breyer and Stevens and Lackey claimants attribute delay to the
state, Justice Thomas and every lower court (except Jones) view
the very same delay but attribute it to the defendant.45 Thus, the
problem with rejecting the prisoner fault argument on empirical
grounds is that it is subject to disputes as to who—the prisoner or
the state—was responsible for the delay in any given case.
Rather than on empirical grounds, Steiker and Steiker’s
second type of solution is rejecting the prisoner fault argument in
principle—“rejecting the notion that seeking enforcement of
constitutional guarantees forfeits the right against excessively
prolonged death-row incarceration.”46 It is this second type of
solution that is the focus of this Article. However, rejecting the
43. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (declaring
the twenty-nine years since petitioner was sentenced to death “a lengthy delay
due in no small part to the State’s malfeasance in this case”).
44. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1120 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)
Justice Thomas suggests that petitioner cannot now challenge the
constitutionality of the delay because much of that delay is his own
fault—he caused it by choosing to challenge the sentence that the
people of Florida deemed appropriate. . . . [T]he delay here resulted in
significant part from constitutionally defective death penalty
procedures for which petitioner was not responsible. In particular, the
delay was partly caused by the sentencing judge’s failure to allow the
presentation and jury consideration of nonstatutory mitigating
circumstances, an approach which we have unanimously held
constitutionally forbidden . . . .
45. Compare Johnson, 558 U.S. at 1067 (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) (contending that the petitioner “bears little, if
any, responsibility for this delay” of over twenty-eight years), with Johnson, 558
U.S. at 1071 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (characterizing the
delay as “occasioned by his appeals”); compare Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990,
993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that delays of
nineteen and twenty-five years were largely due to “the State’s own failure to
comply with the Constitution’s demands”), with Knight, 528 U.S. at 992
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (referring to defendants’ use of
“claims with which they may delay their executions”).
46. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 10, at 682.
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prisoner fault argument in principle would seem to be a
formidable task. First, the prisoner fault argument is enormously
influential. It is the principal response by both Justice Thomas
and the lower courts to the Lackey claim.47 Many, if not nearly
all, lower courts addressing Lackey claims reflexively deny them
by invoking the prisoner fault argument.48 Second, it enjoys an
undeniable element of common sense appeal. If prisoners choose
actions that cause delay, prisoners have in effect chosen delay
and should be held responsible for the resulting delay.
We can begin to see a crack in this edifice of common sense
by simply asking, what does prisoner fault have to do with the
Eighth Amendment? Even if Lackey claimants may be said to be
choosing delay, as the prisoner fault argument maintains, they
are not choosing execution and decades of death row
incarceration. Even if the delay is self-inflicted by the prisoners
themselves, surely the decades of death row incarceration and
execution are not self-inflicted, but rather state-imposed. The
prisoner fault argument addresses delay per se, but the Lackey
claim objects not to delay, but rather to the punishment of
execution following lengthy periods of death row incarceration
violating the Eighth Amendment.49 That is, there is a gap
47. See Jones, 2014 WL 3567365, at *11 (identifying the prisoner fault
argument as one of the two main arguments against the Lackey claim); Steiker
& Steiker, supra note 10, at 682 (designating the prisoner fault argument as one
of the most “obvious difficulties” for the Lackey claim).
48. See, e.g., Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“Because Appellant chose to avail himself of [procedural challenges] . . . we
reject Appellant’s claim that his execution after the lengthy proceedings in this
case [fifteen years on death row] would implicate the Eighth Amendment.”)
(emphasis added); Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at
*38 n.21 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (“‘[N]o federal or state courts have accepted
[the prisoner’s claim] . . . especially where both parties bear responsibility for
the long delay.’” (quoting Knight v. State, 746 So. 2d 423, 437 (Fla. 1998)));
Duncan v. Carpenter, No. 3:88-00992, 2014 WL 3905440, at *16 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 11, 2014) (“[T]he delay . . . occasioned in large part by his own voluntary
pursuit of state and federal remedies, does not entitle him to relief.”); McKinney
v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151 (Idaho 1999) (“Death row prisoners are not entitled
to have their sentences commuted to life because of the delay caused by their
own unsuccessful collateral attacks on their sentences.”) (emphasis added); see
also infra Part II.D.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 16–18 (articulating the Lackey
claim).
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between the prisoner fault argument addressing delay, and both
Lackey claims and the Eighth Amendment addressing
punishment. Who is at fault for the delay does not alter the
nature or character of the punishment that the prisoner receives.
Thirty years of death row incarceration followed by execution is
still just that—no more and no less—regardless of whether the
prisoner or state is at fault for the delay. In short, prisoner fault
for delay seems irrelevant to the Eighth Amendment’s concern
with placing limits on state-imposed punishment. Given the
ubiquity and apparent persuasiveness of the prisoner fault
argument, surely one or more of the courts invoking it have
supplied a supporting rationale or citation to well-grounded
authority. Surprisingly, how or why prisoners’ choice and fault
inoculates executions following upwards of thirty years or more of
death row incarceration from Eighth Amendment violation is
largely unexplained.50
This Article undertakes the first comprehensive and
sustained critical examination of the principal argument
supporting the constitutionality of executions following lengthy
periods of death row incarceration. It does not seek to establish
that excessively delayed executions are unconstitutional. Rather,
the focus is narrower. It merely seeks to establish that the
principal argument supporting the constitutionality of excessively
delayed executions—the prisoner fault argument—lacks an
underlying rationale related to the concerns of the Eighth
Amendment and thus should not foreclose Lackey claims. The
Article contends that the prisoner fault argument should be
rejected for two reasons. First, its proponents have failed to
provide any explicit rationale or well-grounded precedential
authority in support of it. Second, lacking such an explicit
rationale, the Article proposes the two most obvious candidates
for an underlying rationale: (i) analogizing to the analysis of fault
attribution for delays in assessing claims of Sixth Amendment
speedy trial right violations,51 and (ii) by choosing appellate and
50. See cases cited infra notes 137, 152, and 158 (serving as examples of
pre-Lackey rulings which denied petitioners’ Eighth Amendment claims due to
the prisoner fault argument, with little to no explanation as to why prisoner
fault supposedly barred cruel and unusual punishment arguments).
51. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
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collateral review, rather than submitting to execution, prisoners
waive their Eighth Amendment right against execution following
lengthy terms of death row incarceration.52 This Article
demonstrates that these proposed rationales are not only
unpersuasive but also ultimately serve only to provide additional
support for Lackey claims. Moreover, each proposed rationale
presupposes and concedes the same right that Justice Thomas
and the lower courts vehemently deny exists—the right against
excessively delayed executions.53
The remainder of this Article unfolds in the following parts.
Part II traces the history of the prisoner fault argument.
Attempting to identify the source or rationale of the argument, it
begins by presenting the articulations of the argument by Justice
Thomas.54 Finding neither citation to well-grounded authority
nor an underlying rationale, Part II next locates the first
utterance of the argument, in 1960, and examines each
subsequent articulation and rejection of the argument until the
appearance of Justice Stevens’s Lackey Memorandum in 1995.55
It then considers the views of Justices Breyer and Stevens as to
the prisoner fault argument and canvasses the foreign and
international cases they cite, some of which agree with, and some
of which reject, the argument.56 Finally, Part II chronicles the
post-Lackey cases that uniformly applied the prisoner fault
argument until July 2014, when a federal district court rejected
shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial . . . .”); infra Part III.
52. See infra Part IV (providing further explanation of this argument).
53. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1072 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (declaring “that the [Lackey] claim itself has
no constitutional foundation”); id. (“[A] Lackey claim would fail no matter how it
arrived.”); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1117 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“[The central issue is] whether the death-row
inmate’s litigation strategy, which delays his execution, provides a justification
for the Court to invent a new Eighth Amendment right. It does not.”); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari)
(“Consistency would seem to demand that those who accept our death penalty
jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and
execution as a necessary consequence.”); see also infra Parts II.B and D
(discussing Justice Thomas’s arguments).
54. Infra Part II.A.
55. Infra Part II.B.
56. Infra Part II.C.
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the argument not in principle, but on empirical grounds.57 Part II
concludes that while courts rejecting the prisoner fault argument
have provided an underlying rationale for doing so relevant to the
Eighth Amendment, courts utilizing the argument have not.58
With an account of the prisoner fault argument still elusive,
Parts III and IV present the two most obvious candidates for a
possible rationale. Part III proposes analogizing to the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial right.59 The analogy is at least
superficially attractive because of the obvious parallels between
claims of delayed executions and claims of delayed trials.60 After
briefly explaining the speedy trial right and the Supreme Court’s
test for determining its violation, Part III explains how one
aspect of that test—the extent to which fault for trial delays may
be attributed to the defendant—closely mirrors the prisoner fault
argument.61 Having finally located a seemingly plausible
rationale for the prisoner fault argument, it examines more
closely whether the analogy provides a persuasive rationale.62
After presenting three difficulties, Part III concludes that not
only is the speedy trial right analogy unpersuasive as a rationale
but also that it ultimately furnishes additional support for Lackey
claims.
Part IV proposes waiver as a possible rationale for the
prisoner fault argument.63 That is, by choosing to pursue postconviction review and the delay such review entails, prisoners
waive their Eighth Amendment right against execution following
decades of death row incarceration.64 After explaining the waiver
of constitutional rights in general,65 Part IV discusses the extent
of, and particular limitations on, waiver of the Eighth

57. Infra Part II.D.
58. Infra Part II.E.
59. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”); infra Part III.
60. Infra Part III.A.
61. Infra Part III.B.
62. Infra Part III.C.
63. Infra Part IV.
64. Infra Part IV.
65. Infra Part IV.A.
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Amendment.66 Despite the wide consensus that waiver cannot
transform a paradigmatically cruel and unusual punishment like
torture into a humane and ordinary punishment, there is some
Supreme Court authority that might allow waiver of Eighth
Amendment rights regarding an arguably cruel and unusual
punishment.67 As a result, waiver is a seemingly plausible
rationale for the prisoner fault argument.68 Part IV presents six
difficulties, however, and concludes that waiver is not only
unpersuasive as a rationale, but also further supports recognition
of Lackey claims.69 This Article concludes that the principal
argument supporting the constitutionality of excessively delayed
executions—the prisoner fault argument—lacks both an explicit
rationale from its proponents and any conceivable persuasive
rationale.70 Without a supporting rationale relevant to the
concerns of the Eighth Amendment, prisoner fault for excessively
delayed executions should be irrelevant in assessing Lackey
claims.
II. History of Prisoner Fault Argument in Lackey Claims
This Part traces the history of the principal argument used to
deny Lackey claims—prisoner fault for delay—in an attempt to
identify its underlying rationale. Rather than starting at the
beginning, it presents the pronouncements of this argument by
its most important spokesman before proceeding more
chronologically, canvassing articulations of the argument from
the earliest cases to the latest. First, this Part presents Justice
Thomas’s articulations of the argument and the authority that he
cited in support of it.71 Second, finding little authority, this Part
examines the first case to advance the argument and considers all

66. Infra Parts IV.B–C.
67. For more information, see infra Part IV.B.
68. Infra Part IV.B.
69. Infra Part IV.C.
70. Infra Part V.
71. Infra Part II.A. See cases cited infra notes 78–88 for Justice Thomas’s
use of this argument.
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subsequent pre-Lackey cases.72 Third, it discusses Justices Breyer
and Stevens’s view of the argument in Lackey, as well as the
foreign and international cases that Lackey cites.73 Fourth, this
Part surveys post-Lackey state and lower federal courts’
formulations of the argument.74 It concludes that in addition to
there being several state, foreign, and international courts that
directly reject the prisoner fault argument, there is no wellgrounded precedential authority or underlying rationale for the
argument that the vast majority of American courts use to reject
Lackey claims.75
A. Justice Thomas’s Articulations of the Argument
Justice Thomas emphasized prisoners’ choice of and fault for
execution delays in all four of his concurrences to the denial of
certiorari of Lackey claims.76 In Knight v. Florida,77 Justice
Thomas referred to the prisoner as “avail[ing] himself of the
panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then
complain[ing] when his execution is delayed.”78 In Foster v.
Florida,79 Justice Thomas observed that the “[p]etitioner could
long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and uncertainties’ by submitting
to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve:
execution.”80 Neither citation to authority nor explanation as to the
relevance of prisoner fault accompanied these statements. In
Thompson v. McNeil,81 Justice Thomas reiterated both of the above
statements82 and noted that the “petitioner chose to challenge his
72. Infra Part II.B.
73. Infra Part II.C.
74. Infra Part II.D.
75. Infra Part II.E.
76. To review these cases, see infra notes 77–83.
77. 528 U.S. 990 (1999).
78. Id. at 990.
79. 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
80. Id. at 991 (quoting id. at 993 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari)).
81. 556 U.S. 1114 (2009).
82. See id. at 1116–17 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Knight and Foster
directly in order to establish the defendant’s fault in delaying execution).
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death sentence.”83 This time Justice Thomas did cite to some
authority. Disagreeing with Justices Stevens and Breyer that “the
subsequent delay caused by petitioner’s 32 years of litigation
creates an Eighth Amendment problem,”84 Justice Thomas quoted
from a Fourth Circuit concurring opinion: “It makes ‘a mockery of
our system of justice . . . for a convicted murderer, who, through
his own interminable efforts of delay . . . has secured the almostindefinite postponement of his sentence, to then claim that the
almost-indefinite
postponement
renders
his
sentence
85
unconstitutional.’”
How a prisoner making a “mockery”
inoculates execution following decades-long death row
incarceration from Eighth Amendment scrutiny is unexplained,
and the Fourth Circuit concurring opinion, on which Justice
Thomas relied, neither explained the relevance nor cited any
authority in support of its statement.86 Finally, in Johnson v.
Bredesen,87 Justice Thomas reiterated the above statement from
Knight without any citation to authority or explanation of its
relevance to the Eighth Amendment.88 Justice Thomas’s
articulations of the prisoner fault argument neither cite to any
well-grounded precedential authority nor offer an underlying
rationale for why prisoner choice of and fault for delay is relevant
under the Eighth Amendment.89
B. Pre-Lackey Precedent
Written in 1960, Chessman v. Dickson90 is perhaps the first
case to utter the prisoner fault argument.91 In denying the
83. Id. at 1117.
84. Id.
85. Id. (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)).
86. See Turner, 58 F.3d at 933 (Luttig, J., concurring) (asserting that
petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim was absurd and manipulative, without
justification or further explanation).
87. 558 U.S. 1067 (2009).
88. See id. at 1071 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (claiming that Justice
Stevens’s “novel” Eighth Amendment argument has no constitutional basis).
89. See id. at 1072–73.
90. 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960).
91. See id. at 608.
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prisoner’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment stemming from
delay of over eleven years, the Ninth Circuit court declared, “I do
not see how we can offer life (under a death sentence) as a prize
for one who can stall the processes for a given number of years,
especially when in the end it appears the prisoner never really
had any good points.”92 Chessman offered neither citation to
authority nor explanation as to how a prisoner “stall[ing] the
processes” necessarily bars an Eighth Amendment claim.93
In contrast, the next two cases considering the issue treated
the prisoner’s choice and fault as irrelevant. In People v.
Anderson94 in 1972, the state argued “that these delays are
acceptable because they often occur at the instance of the
condemned prisoner.”95 Rejecting this argument, the California
Supreme Court explained that “[a]n appellant’s insistence on
receiving the benefits of appellate review of the judgment
condemning him to death does not render the lengthy period of
impending execution any less torturous or exempt such cruelty
from constitutional proscription.”96 In 1980, in District Attorney
for Suffolk District v. Watson,97 a dissenting opinion argued,
without citation to authority or explanation, “[t]o the extent that
a defendant resorts to those endless appellate procedures, he
should not be heard to complain about the prolongation of his
period of anxiety and agony over his possible execution.”98
Disagreeing, the majority opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts replied,
The fact that the delay may be due to the defendant’s
insistence on exercising his appellate rights does not mitigate
the severity of the impact on the condemned individual, and

92. Id. at 607. A subsequent case interprets this proposition as
“distinguish[ing] between innocent delays and delays caused by a defendant’s
dilatory tactics.” Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 928 (4th Cir. 1995).
93. Chessman, 275 F.2d at 607.
94. 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
95. Id. at 895.
96. Id.
97. 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980).
98. Id. at 1302.
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the right to pursue due process of law must not be set off
against the right to be free from inhuman treatment.99

In contrast to Justice Thomas and Chessman’s use of the prisoner
fault argument,100 both of the above cases rejecting the prisoner
fault argument supplied a rationale related to the concerns of the
Eighth Amendment—prisoner fault for delay is irrelevant under
the Eighth Amendment because it fails to alter the nature or
character of the punishment or consequences the prisoner has to
endure during the delay.101
The remaining cases in the pre-Lackey era all advanced the
prisoner fault argument. In 1986, in Richmond v. Ricketts,102 a
federal district court rejected the prisoner’s contention of lack of
responsibility for the twelve-year delay.103 The delay failed to
violate the Eighth Amendment, the court explained, because it
“was prompted by Richmond’s request . . . to have his challenges
heard by several courts. The fact that this review has taken a
long time does not indicate that the delay is unwarranted.”104 The
court, however, failed to explain why arguably cruel and unusual
punishment that is “[]warranted” and “prompted” by the
defendant necessarily forecloses Eighth Amendment scrutiny.105
The only authority cited for this proposition is the Ninth Circuit
case of Chessman, discussed above, which itself neither cited any
authority nor provided any explanation as to why delay that is
99. Id. at 1283. Further explaining the irrelevance of the prisoner’s choice,
the court noted, “[I]t is often the very reluctance of society to impose the
irrevocable sanction of death which mandates, ‘even against the wishes of the
criminal, that all legal avenues be explored before the execution is finally
carried out.’” Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 n.37 (1972)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
100. For Justice Thomas’s use of the argument, see supra Part II.A. For
Chessman’s use of the argument, see supra text accompanying notes 92–93.
101. See infra notes 144–149 and accompanying text.
102. 640 F. Supp. 767 (D. Ariz. 1986).
103. See id. at 803 (noting the procedural actions made by petitioner which
resulted in the delay, including filing a petition for relief, requesting review by
the Arizona Supreme Court, seeking relief in the United States Supreme Court,
and filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus).
104. Id.
105. See id. (concluding, without further explanation, that “Richmond has
presented nothing to this court which would support the relief he seeks under
this allegation”).
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the prisoner’s choice or responsibility necessarily precluded
Eighth Amendment violation.106
On appeal, in Richmond v. Lewis,107 in 1990, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Richmond’s Eighth
Amendment claim.108 In support of its use of the prisoner fault
argument, Richmond offered Chessman and Andrews v.
Shulsen109 as “relevant, though not controlling, precedents.”110
Richmond explained that the Andrews “court reasoned that to
accept petitioner’s argument would be ‘a mockery of justice’ given
that the delay was attributable more to petitioner’s actions [of
challenging his death sentence] than to the state’s.”111 But
Richmond failed to explain how a purported “mockery of justice”
foreclosed the Eighth Amendment.112
Andrews, however, did offer somewhat of a rationale.
Andrews argued that “[t]he extensive and repeated review of
petitioner’s death sentence was sought by petitioner and is
afforded by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and by
federal law. To accept petitioner’s argument would create an
irreconcilable conflict between constitutional guarantees and
would be a mockery of justice.”113 But this rationale is hardly
persuasive. Apparently, the irreconcilable conflict would be the
prisoner having both the right to challenge his death sentence
and the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
106. See id. For a brief discussion of Chessman, see supra text accompanying
notes 91–93.
107. 948 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1990).
108. See id. at 1492 (citing Chessman to support its assertion that delays
caused by the petitioner’s constitutional challenges are not necessarily
unwarranted).
109. 600 F. Supp. 408 (D. Utah 1984).
110. Richmond, 948 F.2d at 1491.
111. Id. (quoting Andrews, 600 F. Supp. at 431). The prisoner in Andrews
was not making a Lackey claim, but instead argued that the repeated setting
and staying of execution dates violated the Eighth Amendment. Andrews, 600 F.
Supp. at 431.
112. See Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d 1473, 1491 (9th Cir. 1990) (“We know
of no decision by either the United States Supreme Court or this circuit that has
held that the accumulation of time a defendant spends on death row during the
prosecution of his appeals can accrue into an independent constitutional
violation, and Richmond has cited no such decision.”).
113. Andrews, 600 F. Supp. at 431.
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where the former creates the conditions for a violation of the
latter. The conflict is hardly irreconcilable, however. There is no
conflict at all if either the former is done in a timely manner or a
death sentence is commuted to a life sentence (capital
punishment is not constitutionally obligatory).
Two Seventh Circuit cases decided less than a week prior to
Lackey also invoked the prisoner fault argument.114 In 1995, Free
v. Peters115 denied a Lackey claim because “any inordinate delay
in the execution of Free’s sentence is directly attributable to his
own conduct.”116 The court offered neither citation to authority
nor any explanation as to the relevance of the court’s argument to
the Eighth Amendment.117 Decided the same day, Williams v.
Chrans118 denied a Lackey claim based on the reasoning, such as
there is, of Free.119
C. Views of Justices Breyer and Stevens
In Lackey, Justice Stevens acknowledged that, at least for
some types of prisoner actions, prisoner responsibility for delay
was arguably relevant: “There may well be constitutional
significance to the reasons for the various delays that have
occurred in petitioner’s case.”120 He noted that “[i]t may be
appropriate to distinguish” among the following three reasons for
delay:
(a) a petitioner’s abuse of the legal system by . . . repetitive,
frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of the
right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the
114. See cases cited infra notes 115 and 118 and accompanying text
(providing citations to these cases).
115. 50 F.3d 1362 (7th Cir. 1995).
116. Id. at 1362.
117. See id. (concluding that “[t]he circumstances of this case are clearly
distinguishable from Lackey”).
118. 50 F.3d 1363 (7th Cir. 1995).
119. See id. at 1364 (“[W]e are bound by the doctrines of stare decisis and
precedent to the rule established by the panel in Free.” (citing Free, 50 F.3d at
1362)).
120. 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari)
(emphasis added).
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State. Thus, though English cases indicate that the prisoner
should not be held responsible for delays occurring in the
latter two categories, it is at least arguable that some portion
of the time that has elapsed since this petitioner was first
sentenced to death in 1978 should be excluded from the
calculus.121

Notice that Justice Stevens employed three qualifiers in the
above quoted language (the three italicized words).122 He did not
state that prisoner fault suffices to bar a Lackey claim; equally,
Justice Stevens did not state that prisoner fault is irrelevant. 123
His precise view is unclear. And Justice Stevens failed to explain
why any types of prisoner fault might be relevant to the Eighth
Amendment.124 Although in his subsequent memorandums
respecting denial of certiorari of Lackey claims Justice Stevens
did stress that the prisoners were not at fault, or not entirely at
fault, for the delays, he never returned to the issue of whether
prisoner fault is relevant in principle.125
Perhaps Justice Stevens conceded that at least some types of
prisoner fault “may” be and “arguably” are relevant to
acknowledge that some English cases assumed its relevance.126 In
the 1993 case, Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica,127 the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British House of
Lords, the highest court in England and the highest court of
appeal for many Commonwealth countries, found that a fourteenyear delay was “inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment”

121. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 120–121.
123. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (mentioning prisoner’s
abuse of the judicial system as a possible factor to consider).
124. See id.
125. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) (“[Petitioner]
bears little, if any, responsibility for this delay.”); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S.
1114, 1116 (2008) (“[D]elays have multiple causes, including ‘the States’ failure
to apply constitutionally sufficient procedures at the time of initial [conviction
or] sentencing.’” (quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari))).
126. See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (acknowledging the possible importance of
reasons for delay).
127. [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (P.C.) (en banc) (appeal taken from Jam.).
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in violation of the Jamaican constitution.128 Some portions of the
opinion suggested that delay is entirely the responsibility of the
state:
[A] state that wishes to retain capital punishment must accept
the responsibility of ensuring that execution follows as swiftly
as practicable after sentence . . . . If the appellate procedure
enables the prisoner to prolong the appellate hearings over a
period of years, the fault is to be attributed to the appellate
system that permits such delay and not to the prisoner who
takes advantage of it.129

But another portion of the opinion found that prisoners
should be responsible for frivolous challenges: “If delay is due
entirely to the fault of the accused such as . . . frivolous and time
wasting resort to legal procedures which amount to an abuse of
process the defendant cannot be allowed to take advantage of the
delay . . . .”130 But the court failed to explain how this type of
prisoner fault transforms “inhuman or degrading punishment or
treatment” into acceptable treatment.131
Pratt surveyed other precedents regarding responsibility for
delay.132 Two previous Privy Council decisions found that the
delays were the prisoner’s responsibility.133 In Abbott v. AttorneyGeneral of Trinidad and Tobago,134 the Privy Council ruled that
the prisoner “‘cannot complain about the delay totalling three
years . . . caused by his own action in appealing against his
conviction or about the delay totalling two years . . . caused by his
own action in appealing against the sentence.’”135 The Privy
Council in Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica136 agreed: “‘Apart
128. See id. at 33–36 (P.C. 1993) (“To execute these men now after holding
them in custody in an agony of suspense for so many years would be inhuman
punishment within the meaning of section 17(1) [of the Jamaican
Constitution].”).
129. Id. at 33.
130. Id. at 29–30.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 3 (discussing other cases involving responsibility for delay).
133. See id. at 30–31 (citing two other Privy Council decisions finding a
prisoner responsible for delays).
134. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Trin. & Tobago).
135. Id. at 1345.
136. [1983] 1 A.C. 719 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Jam.).
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from the delays necessarily occasioned by the appellate
procedures pursued by the appellant (of which it could hardly lie
in any applicant’s mouth to complain) . . . .’”137 A Canadian
Supreme Court case, Kindler v. Canada,138 similarly found delay
to be the prisoner’s responsibility.139 Noting that “a defendant is
never forced to undergo the full appeal procedure,” the court
observed, “it would be ironic if delay caused by the appellant’s
taking advantage of the full and generous avenue of the appeals
available to him should be viewed as a violation of fundamental
justice.”140 But the court failed to explain how the absence of force
and the presence of irony were relevant.141
Other authorities cited by Pratt found the cause of the delay
irrelevant because it did not alter the consequences for the
prisoner.142 In Vatheeswaran v. State of Tamil Nadu,143 the
Indian Supreme Court stated, “‘[w]e think that the cause of the
delay is immaterial when the sentence is death. Be the cause for
the delay, the time necessary for appeal . . . or some other cause
for which the accused himself may be responsible, it would not
alter the dehumanizing character of the delay.’”144 In Soering v.
United Kingdom,145 the European Court of Human Rights
considered whether the extradition, by the United Kingdom, of a
West German citizen to Virginia for a capital offense would
subject the extraditee to “torture or to inhuman or degrading
punishment or treatment” in violation of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms.146 The United Kingdom invoked the prisoner fault
137. Id. at 724.
138. [1991] 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
139. See id. at 15.
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See Pratt v. Attorney-General of Jam., [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 32 (P.C.) (en
banc) (appeal taken from Jam.) (citing other cases that refused to recognize the
cause of the delay as relevant).
143. [1983] 2 S.C.R. 348 (India).
144. Id. at 353. The Indian “court held that delay exceeding two
years . . . should be sufficient” to render a subsequent execution
unconstitutional. Pratt, [1994] 2 A.C. at 32.
145. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 439 (1989).
146. See id. at 439.
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argument: “[I]nsofar as the delays exist because of the
availability of avenues of appeal coupled with an intentional
tactic of delay,” they do not violate the Convention.147 Disagreeing
and finding that extradition would violate the Convention
because of the likely prolonged stay on death row of six to eight
years, the court explained as follows:
This length of time awaiting death is, as . . . the United
Kingdom Government noted, in a sense largely of the
prisoner’s own making in that he takes advantage of all
avenues of appeal . . . . Nevertheless . . . it is equally part of
human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting
those safeguards to the full. However well-intentioned and
even potentially beneficial is the provision of the complex of
post-sentence procedures in Virginia, the consequence is that
the condemned prisoner has to endure for many years the
conditions on death row . . . .148

Significantly, not only did Vatheeswaran and Soering directly
reject the prisoner fault argument, but also they, unlike courts
advancing the argument, did supply a relevant rationale.149 It is
essentially the same rationale as the two state courts (Anderson
and Watson) rejecting the prisoner fault argument—prisoner
fault for delay is irrelevant because it does not change the nature
or character of the torturous consequences for the prisoner.150 If
the punishment of or consequences for the prisoner are cruel and
unusual, no amount of prisoner choice and fault can change that.
Justice Stevens’s acknowledgment in Lackey that prisoner
fault may be or arguably is relevant cannot be attributed to
Justice Breyer.151 Justice Breyer did not fully join Justice
Stevens’s memorandum but merely stated that he “agrees with
Justice Stevens that the issue [Lackey claims] is an important
147. See id. at 493.
148. Id. at 475.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 144 and 148 (citing cases that
disregard the cause of delay in finding it inhumane).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 96 and 99 (noting the disagreement
among courts regarding inhuman treatment as a result of delay caused by a
prisoner’s exhaustion of the appellate process).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 120–126 (discussing Justice
Stevens’s opinion in Lackey).
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undecided one.”152 And like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer never
clearly states a view as to the relevance of prisoner fault in
principle. But in Valle v. Florida,153 Justice Breyer tantalizingly
hints that prisoner fault may be irrelevant in principle:
It might be argued that Valle, not the State, is responsible for
the long delay. But Valle replies that more than two decades of
delay reflect the State’s failure to provide the kind of trial and
penalty procedures that the law requires. Regardless, one
cannot realistically expect a defendant condemned to death to
refrain from fighting for his life by seeking to use whatever
procedures the law allows.154

At the risk of over interpretation, Justice Breyer may be
arguing that “regardless” of whether the prisoner or the state is
responsible for the delay, the prisoner cannot be faulted for the
delay in the sense that it should not be a basis to deny his
claim.155 Though not entirely clear, Justice Breyer may be
suggesting that prisoner fault is irrelevant.
D. Post-Lackey Precedent
Perhaps the most influential post-Lackey federal circuit court
case is McKenzie v. Day.156 In denying the prisoner’s claim that
execution following a twenty-year delay violates the Eighth
Amendment, McKenzie stated that “[t]he delay has been caused
by the fact that McKenzie has availed himself of [opportunities to
challenge his sentence].”157 McKenzie emphasized that delay is
the choice of the prisoner:

152. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (respecting denial of
certiorari).
153. 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011).
154. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
155. See id.
156. 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Kathleen M. Flynn, The “Agony of
Suspense”: How Protracted Death Row Confinement Gives Rise to an Eighth
Amendment Claim of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
291, 293 (1997) (citing McKenzie v. Day as an important decision).
157. McKenzie, 132 S. Ct. at 1466–67.
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A number of death row inmates have refused to avail
themselves of avenues of review precisely to avoid this ordeal
[of decades on death row]. This option is available to anyone
sentenced to die, and to the extent petitioners choose to delay
execution in the hope of obtaining relief, that is a choice they
make for themselves.158

Neither citation to authority nor explanation of relevance to
the Eighth Amendment accompanied the above statements.159 As
the dissent observed, “However this issue of fact [whether the
state or prisoner is responsible for the delay] is eventually
decided (if it ever has to be decided), it in no way throws into
doubt the viability of McKenzie’s Eighth Amendment claim.”160
Numerous other federal circuit court cases have denied
Lackey claims by invoking the prisoner fault argument.161 The
cases either asserted this argument with no citation to authority,
no argument supporting its relevance under the Eighth
Amendment, or by citation to one of the cases discussed above,
which, in turn, failed to explain the relevance of this argument

158. Id. at 1470 n.21 (citations omitted).
159. See supra notes 157–158.
160. McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1486.
161. See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 957 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006)
(distinguishing the prisoner’s claim from other cases “where much of the delay
had been due to the State’s own errors”); Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560,
570 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Delay has come about because Chambers, of course with
justification, has contested the judgments against him, and, on two occasions,
has done so successfully.”); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1996)
(“White has had the choice of seeking further review . . . or avoiding further
delay of his execution by not petitioning for further review . . . .”); Stafford v.
Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1029 n.5 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[B]ecause Appellant chose to
avail himself of stays to pursue these avenues of review, they may not be used to
support an Eighth Amendment claim.”); Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th
Cir. 1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) (“The delay of which he [the prisoner] now
complains is a direct consequence of his own litigation strategy . . . .”); Fearance
v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 639 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Fearance was not the victim of a
Bleak House-like procedural system hopelessly bogged down; at every turn,
he . . . sought extensions of time, hearings and reconsiderations.”); Porter v.
Singletary, 49 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1995) (“We note that Porter has
proffered no evidence to establish that delays in his case have been attributable
to negligence or deliberate action of the state.” (citations omitted)).
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under the Eighth Amendment.162 The same applies to federal
district court cases163 and state cases164 rejecting Lackey claims.
As discussed above, the lone federal case to recognize a
Lackey claim, Jones v. Chappell, declined to directly address the
relevance of prisoner fault in principle.165 Instead, it treated the
162. See supra note 161 and infra notes 163–164.
163. See, e.g., Booker v. McNeil, No. 1:08cv143/RS, 2010 WL 3942866, at *38
n.21 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 5, 2010) (“[N]o federal or state courts have accepted [the
prisoner’s claim] . . . especially where both parties bear responsibility for the
long delay.”); Hairston v. Paskett, No. CV-00-303-S-BLW, 2008 WL 3874614, at
*8 (D. Idaho Aug. 15, 2008) (“[P]rolonged incarceration under a sentence of
death does not offend the Eighth Amendment, particularly when the delay
results from prisoners unsuccessful pursuit of collateral relief and not from the
State’s dilatory tactics.”); Delvecchio v. Illinois, No. 95C6637, 1995 WL 688675,
at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1995) (“Petitioner has extended the time . . . of his
execution and therefore, any additional punishment caused by the delay is
attributable to the petitioner.”).
164. See, e.g., State v. Schackart, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (Ariz. 1997)
(“[D]efendant’s claim that the state is solely responsible for the delays in this
case is inaccurate.”); People v. Hill, 839 P.2d 984, 1017 (Cal. 1992) (“Defendant,
however, does not—and in good faith cannot—allege even the slightest undue
delay by the state in this case.”); Valle v. Florida, 70 So. 3d 530, 552 (Fla. 2011)
(“Valle ‘cannot now contend that his punishment has been illegally prolonged
because the delay in carrying out his sentence is in large part due to his own
actions in challenging his convictions[s] and sentence.’” (quoting Tompkins v.
State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1085 (Fla. 2008))); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 151
(Idaho 1999) (“Death row prisoners are not entitled to have their sentences
commuted to life because of the delay caused by their own unsuccessful
collateral attacks on their sentences.”); Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697
(Ind. 2005) (“[T]he time between his conviction and the approaching execution
flows from his having availed himself of the appeals process.”); State v. Sparks,
68 So. 3d 435, 492 (La. 2011) (“Much of the delay in the direct appeal is clearly
attributable to the defendant. . . . Thus his argument contending the length of
time on death row violates the Eighth Amendment rings hollow.”); Jordan v.
State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1028 (Miss. 2001) (“[T]he Constitution would not protect a
defendant who availed himself of the ‘panoply of appellate and collateral
procedures’ and then claimed that his execution had been long delayed.”
(quoting Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari))); State v. Smith, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (Mont. 1996) (noting
that defendant “has availed himself [of the review process] . . . which has
resulted in the delay and the multiple sentencing hearings in this case”); State
v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 94 (Neb. 1999) (“The delay in carrying out the
sentence of death has been caused by the fact that Moore has availed himself of
[the review process] . . . .”); State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 486 (Tenn. 2002)
(“As in most cases, the delay in the instant case was caused in large part by
numerous appeals and collateral attacks lodged by the Appellant.”).
165. See Jones v. Chappell, No. CV09-02158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, *11–13
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issue empirically by “find[ing] that much of the delay in
California’s post-conviction process is created by the State itself,
not by inmates’ own interminable efforts to delay.”166 And
regarding the case at bar, the court noted that “there is no
evidence of frivolous filings or unreasonable delay caused by” the
prisoner.167
E. Conclusion
Based somewhat on Justice Stevens’s typology of reasons for
delay,168 there are three principal positions courts take as to the
relevance of the reason or party at fault for delay. First, only
where the delay is largely or entirely due to negligence or
deliberate delay by the state should a Lackey claim possibly be
recognized.169 This seems to be the position, in principle, of courts
denying Lackey claims, but as an empirical matter, such courts
invariably fail to find negligence or deliberate delay by the
state.170 Second, only in cases where the delay is largely due to
the prisoner frivolously employing legal process to intentionally
delay should a Lackey claim be foreclosed.171 This is the position
of some cases recognizing Lackey claims, for example Pratt.172
Third, the reason for the delay is immaterial.173 This is the
position of some courts recognizing Lackey claims, for example,
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014) (highlighting that California’s application of its death
penalty system does not assume that the inmate causes the delay).
166. Id. at *12.
167. Id. at *12 n.20.
168. See supra text accompanying note 121 (listing three reasons for delay
that Justice Stevens identifies as potentially important).
169. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995).
170. See sources cited supra notes 45, 161–164 (comparing cases that
attribute delay to the inefficacy of the state’s judicial process with cases that
view the same delay as attributable to the defendant and implement the
prisoner fault argument).
171. See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (noting that filing repetitive, frivolous
claims constitutes an abuse of the legal system).
172. See supra text accompanying note 130 (emphasizing that courts hold
prisoners responsible for frivolous challenges).
173. See supra text accompanying note 144 (describing delay as
“dehumanizing” regardless of its cause).
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Anderson, Watson, Vatheeswaran, and Soering.174 Only courts
taking the third position have been able to muster a rationale
relevant to the concerns of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment: regardless of the source
of or fault for the delay, the nature and character of the
punishment of or torturous consequences for the prisoner
remains the same.175
Perhaps further evidencing the lack of a principled rationale,
the first two positions face some difficult questions. The question
that those taking either of the first two positions—the cause of
the delay is relevant—have failed to answer is how does prisoner
fault transform what otherwise would be cruel and unusual
punishment into humane and ordinary punishment? The
questions that those taking the second position—prisoner fault is
relevant depending on whether the use of legal process was
legitimate or frivolous—have failed to answer are as follows: How
does execution following decades of incarceration on death row
change from cruel and unusual to humane and ordinary by
changing the classification of a prisoner’s use of legal process
from legitimate to frivolous? Is it plausible to say that whether a
174. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 99, 144, and 148 (describing the
delay as tortuous and inhumane whether or not the prisoner contributes to it).
175. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 99, 144, and 148 (noting that the
cause of the delay does not change the fact that the delay results in inhumane
treatment of death row inmates). One type of prisoner action, however, may
both increase delay and change the nature and character of the punishment or
consequences the prisoner receives during the delay—escape from death row.
Because the prisoner is suffering from neither punishment nor torturous
consequences while away from death row, delay caused by that type of prisoner
fault might be relevant even under the third position. Thus, the more precise
articulation of the third position might be that prisoner fault is irrelevant where
it does not alter the nature and character of the punishment of or torturous
consequences for the prisoner during the delay. Because so few death row
prisoners escape, this consideration is often overlooked and, as a practical
matter, may not be significant. Nonetheless, the prison escape situation does
underscore that the better and more precise understanding of the Lackey claim
is not that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is violated by an excessively delayed execution. Rather, it is
violated by execution following a sufficiently lengthy period of death row
incarceration. Expressing the right violated as a right to a timely execution or
as a right against excessively delayed execution is merely a short-cut expression
of the right that reflects the infrequency of death row escapes.
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prisoner deserves execution turns on whether or not his legal
filings are “repetitive”?176 These questions are difficult to answer
for those finding cause of delay relevant (the first two positions)
because cause of delay seems unrelated to Eighth Amendment
concerns. The relevance of the cause of the delay seems
procedural-based and inadequate to address the substantive
concerns of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.
While their position is unclear, to the extent that Justices
Breyer and Stevens, and the Jones court, do find at least some
types of prisoner fault to be relevant, the above questions are
even more difficult to answer given their support of Lackey
claims. Justices Breyer and Stevens powerfully argue that “the
penological justifications for the death penalty [retribution and
deterrence] diminish as the delay lengthens.”177 Jones agrees.178
Does prisoner fault affect this relationship between delay and the
penological justifications? It is difficult to see how it could. If
prisoner fault cannot alter this relationship, then perhaps
prisoner fault should be irrelevant. But if at least some types of
prisoner conduct are sufficiently relevant to bar Lackey claims,
would that mean that the penological justifications for the death
penalty increase as a prisoner’s filings become increasingly
repetitive? To avoid that absurdity, perhaps as a prisoner’s filings
become increasingly repetitive execution becomes increasingly
constitutional despite the diminution of the penological
justifications for execution. But that is no less absurd. To avoid
176. See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (Stevens, J., respecting
denial of certiorari) (describing “repetitive, frivolous filings” by defendant as an
abuse of the judicial system).
177. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1067 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Breyer, J., respecting denial of certiorari); accord Knight v. Florida,
528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“[T]he
longer the delay, the weaker the justification for imposing the death penalty in
terms of punishment’s basic retributive or deterrent purposes.”).
178. See Jones v. Chappell, No. CV09-02158-CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at *10
(C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014) (contending that “long delays preceding execution
frustrate whatever deterrent effect the death penalty may have”); id. (citing
Lewis Powell, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1989) (“The
retributive value of the death penalty is diminished as imposition of sentence
becomes ever farther removed from the time of the offense.”)).
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these absurdities, perhaps prisoner fault should be irrelevant to
the assessment of Lackey claims.
III. Analogy to Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right
Tracing the history of the prisoner fault argument in Part II
revealed neither the support of well-grounded precedential
authority nor a persuasive underlying rationale related to the
concerns of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Moreover, the courts rejecting the
argument and declaring prisoner fault irrelevant do supply a
rationale related to Eighth Amendment concerns.179 With a
rationale for the prisoner fault argument still elusive, Parts III
and IV advance the two most obvious possible candidates.
This Part proposes analogizing to the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy . . . trial.”180 This “fundamental” right applies to states as
well through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.181 The speedy trial right protects against delays
between accusation (or the filing of formal criminal charges) and
the commencement of a criminal trial.182 Because reversing and
remanding for a new trial would only exacerbate already existing
delay, the “only possible remedy” for a violation of this right is
dismissal of the indictment or charges with prejudice.183 The Due
Process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments extends
179. See supra Part II.E.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
181. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1967) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment enforces the Sixth Amendment against the
States).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (explaining
that the speedy trial right attaches “when a criminal prosecution has begun and
extends only to those . . . who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that
prosecution”); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“The
constitutional right to a speedy trial is triggered when an indictment is returned
against a defendant.”).
183. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
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this right of expeditious process beyond the commencement of the
trial to at least the direct appeal stage.184 It also extends to delays
in sentencing185 and thus could possibly extend to delays between
sentencing and execution.
One might think that the analogy is less helpful to courts
rejecting Lackey claims and more helpful to Lackey claimants. A
Lackey claimant could argue, based on the analogy, that decadeslong stays on death row violate the prisoner’s right to an
expeditious execution. In fact, some death row prisoners have
made exactly this claim, both in conjunction with an Eighth
Amendment Lackey claim186 and without.187 Commentators have
also argued that decades-long stays on death row implicate and
may violate the speedy trial, or related due process, right.188
184. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312 (1986) (noting that
“safeguards [of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial] may be as
important to the accused when the delay is occasioned by an unduly long
appellate process as when the delay is caused by . . . continuances in the date of
the trial”); see generally Marc M. Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal: A Right
Without a Remedy, 74 MINN. L. REV. 437 (1990) (noting the prevalence of delays
during criminal appeals and discussing possible remedies).
185. See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 357 (1957) (regarding delays
between trial and sentencing); United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 301 (6th
Cir. 1999) (regarding delays between appellate court decision and resentencing
hearing).
186. See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 68 So. 3d 435, 491 (La. 2011) (“[Prisoner’s]
argument has two components. First . . . executing him after twenty-three years
on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Second . . . the delay
violates his right to due process and a speedy trial.”).
187. See, e.g., State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 998 (Ind. 2007) (“[Prisoner]
says he makes no Eighth Amendment or ‘Lackey’ claim in this appeal. He
contends instead that the delay in his case has violated the Speedy Trial Clause
of the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.”).
188. See Dwight Aarons, Getting Out of this Mess: Steps Toward Addressing
and Avoiding Inordinate Delay in Capital Cases, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 40 (1998) (noting that the Lackey claim “is analogous to a claim based on the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial or to the due process right to a speedy
criminal appeal”); Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death
Sentence and Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON
HALL L. REV. 147, 207 (1998) [hereinafter Aarons, Inordinate Delay] (considering
the applicability of the analysis used to assess speedy trial right violation claims
to Lackey claims); Jeremy Root, Note, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A
Reconsideration of the Lackey Claim, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 321
(2001) (“The policies supporting the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth
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The analogy, however, may also supply a rationale for the
prisoner fault argument. Lying within the analysis used to assess
claims of speedy trial right violations is a doctrine that if not the
source of the prisoner fault argument is closely related. The
doctrine maintains that delays in the commencement of trial
caused by the legal processes that a defendant chooses to
pursue—pretrial motions, pretrial evidentiary hearings, etc.—are
attributed to the defendant, not the state, and do not count
toward whatever period of delay suffices to establish a speedy
trial right violation.189 Applying this doctrine of speedy trial right
analysis to the Lackey claim context generates the prisoner fault
argument: execution delays caused by the prisoner’s pursuit of
appellate and collateral review are attributed to the prisoner, not
the state, and do not contribute to the imposition of a cruel and
unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.
This Part contains three subparts. First, it presents the
speedy trial right analysis propounded by the Supreme Court and
applied by the lower courts.190 Second, it demonstrates how an
aspect of that analysis may support the prisoner fault argument
and assesses the extent to which the speedy trial right analogy is
helpful to courts rejecting Lackey claims.191 Third, it
demonstrates some difficulties with the analogy and concludes
that the analogy ultimately provides more support to Lackey
claims than courts rejecting those claims.192
A. The Speedy Trial Right Test
Barker v. Wingo193 advanced the leading test for assessing
speedy trial right violations as well as due process claims
Amendment are directly relevant to claims that inordinate delay between the
day of the sentence and the day of the execution violate constitutional rights,
because a parallel set of interests are at stake.”).
189. See infra Part III.B (describing the allocation of fault when assessing
delays).
190. Infra Part III.A.
191. Infra Part III.B.
192. Infra Part III.C.
193. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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regarding delays beyond the trial stage.194 Before arriving at its
comparatively more flexible test, the Supreme Court first
considered and rejected two “rigid” alternatives.195 First, trials
must commence within a specified time period, for example,
within six months from the indictment or formal charges.196 The
Court rejected this approach because the right cannot be so
simply “quantified into a specified number of days or months.”197
Second, the “demand-waiver” doctrine provided that a defendant
waives the right unless and until the defendant demands it. 198
The premise of the doctrine is that delay generally benefits
defendants.199 The Court rejected this approach for three
reasons.200 First, “presuming waiver of a fundamental right from
inaction[] is inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on
waiver of constitutional rights.”201 Second, “it is not necessarily
true that delay benefits the defendant.”202 Third, “[a] defendant
194. See, e.g., id. at 530 (announcing a four factor balancing test to
determine speedy trial and due process violations involving delays); Harris v.
Champion, 15 F.3d 1538, 1546–47 (10th Cir. 1994) (employing the four factor
Barker test regarding delays on appeal); State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 1000–
01 (Ind. 2007) (using the four factor Barker test regarding post-trial delay under
the Due Process Clause).
195. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 522–30 (discussing the two alternative
approaches).
196. See id. at 523 (“The first suggestion is that we hold that the
Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a
specified time period.”).
197. See id. (rejecting the specified time period approach).
198. See id. at 523–25 (“The second suggested alternative would restrict
consideration of the right to those cases in which the accused has demanded a
speedy trial.”).
199. See id. at 526 (stating that the demand waiver doctrine “usually works
for the benefit of the accused”).
200. See id. at 528 (rejecting “the rule that a defendant who fails to demand
a speedy trial forever waives his right”).
201. Id. at 525. The Court further explained that it “has defined waiver as
‘an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.’”
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). “[C]ourts should
‘indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.’” Id. (quoting Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)). “‘[P]resuming waiver from a silent
record is impermissible.’” Id. at 526 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
516 (1962)).
202. Id. at 526. The Court cites two reasons that delay does not necessarily
benefit the defendant. First, delay hampers the ability to mount a defense. See
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has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as
well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due
process.”203 Because “society has a particular interest in bringing
swift prosecutions . . . society’s representatives are the ones who
should protect that interest.”204
Eschewing either rigid approach, Barker announced a fourfactor balancing test: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay,
the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the
defendant.”205 The first factor—length of delay—serves as a
“triggering mechanism;” absent a sufficiently long delay there is
no need to analyze the other factors.206 Courts generally consider
a delay of one year or more as “presumptively prejudicial.”207 The
second factor—“the reason the government assigns to justify the
delay”—is differentially weighed depending on the reason.208 As
to the third factor—defendant’s assertion of the right—the
defendant’s failure to assert the right will make establishing a
speedy trial right violation “difficult.”209 But it does not waive the
id. (noting that, in certain cases, delay harms the defendant’s ability to defend
himself). Second, and “[m]oreover, a defendant confined to jail prior to trial is
obviously disadvantaged by delay.” Id. at 527.
203. Id. at 527 (citing Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 37–38 (1970)
(“Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as
long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is
fundamental and the duty of the charging authorities is to provide a prompt
trial.”)); Hodges v. United States, 408 F.2d 543, 551 (8th Cir. 1969) (“The
government and . . . trial court are not without responsibility for the expeditious
trial of criminal cases . . . . The right to ‘a speedy . . . trial’ is constitutionally
guaranteed and, as such, is not to be honored only for the vigilant . . . .”).
204. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972).
205. Id. at 530.
206. See id. (describing the length of delay as a “triggering mechanism”).
207. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 n.1 (1992)
(“Depending on the nature of the charges, the lower courts have generally found
postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’ at least as it approaches one
year.”); United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1208 (10th Cir. 2010)
(“Generally, delays approaching one year are presumptively prejudicial.”);
Speedy Trial, 43 ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 418, 422 (2014) (“Courts generally hold
that a delay in excess of one year is presumptively prejudicial.”).
208. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (“Here, too, different weight should be
assigned to different reasons.”).
209. See id. at 532 (“The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right, then,
is entitled to strong evidentiary weight . . . .”).
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right or bar relief entirely for two reasons.210 First, there is no
precise time at which the defendant must assert or waive the
right.211 Second, the Court “places the primary burden on the
courts and prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to
trial.”212 The fourth factor—prejudice to the defendant—is
“assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect[:] . . . (i) to prevent
oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the
defense will be impaired.”213 Although the Court identified the
third interest as the “most serious,”214 the Court explained that
“if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his ability to gather
evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare his defense.”215
Thus the first interest, by contributing directly to the third
interest, may be at least as serious.
The Court stressed that none of these four factors is either a
necessary or a sufficient condition for a speedy trial right
violation.216 That is, just as no single factor suffices for a
violation, the absence of a single factor does not preclude a
violation.217 Each of the four factors must be balanced and
weighed together.218 Some of the factors are interrelated.219 Not
only does “the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the
210. See id. at 528 (rejecting the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a
speedy trial waives his right entirely).
211. See id. at 521–22 (noting that the right to a speedy trial remains a
vague concept).
212. Id. at 529.
213. Id. at 532.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 533.
216. See id. (“We regard none of the four factors identified above as either a
necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of
speedy trial.”).
217. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992) (finding
a speedy trial violation in the absence of particularized evidence of the fourth
factor—prejudice to the defendant).
218. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (describing the Court’s
test as a balancing test that weighs the conduct of both the prosecution and the
defendant).
219. See, e.g., id. at 531 (noting the close relationship of the length of the
delay to the reasons the government uses to justify the delay).
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accused intensif[y] over time,”220 but also the prejudice factor’s
weight or “importance increases with the length of delay.”221 As a
balancing test, courts must “necessarily . . . approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis.”222 Although it “is a balancing test, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are
weighed,”223 the Court “places the primary burden on the courts
and prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to trial.”224
B. Support for Prisoner Fault Argument
The second factor—the government’s “reason for the delay,”
as articulated by Barker,225 or “whether the government or the
criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay,” as
articulated by a subsequent Supreme Court decision, Doggett v.
United States226—is the factor most relevant to the prisoner fault
argument against Lackey claims. Intentional delay by the
government weighs heavily against the state, negligence such as
overcrowded courts weighs against the government but less so,
and valid reasons justify the delay.227 Note the parallels (and the
differences) between the three reasons for delay under Barker
and Justice Stevens’s three possible reasons for delay in

220. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652.
221. Id. at 656. Put a different way, “such is the nature of the prejudice
presumed that the weight we assign to official negligence compounds over time
as the presumption of evidentiary prejudice grows. Thus, our toleration of such
negligence varies inversely with its protractedness . . . .” Id. at 657. These twin
effects might be explained more simply. First, the longer the delay, the greater
the presumption of prejudice to the defendant. Second, the longer the delay, the
greater the weight assigned to the factor of prejudice. Thus, combining their
effects, the longer the delay, the presumption of prejudice becomes stronger and
the factor of prejudice attains greater weight.
222. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530 (“A balancing test necessarily compels
courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.”).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 530.
226. 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992).
227. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (indicating that
“different weights should be assigned to different reasons” for delay).
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Lackey,228 and the way that each reason is assessed as favorable
or not to each party:
Table 1
Speedy Trial Right Reasons for Delay
According to Barker
Favorable to Defendant:
State’s Intentional Delay

Lackey Claim Reasons for Delay
According to Justice Stevens
Favorable to Prisoner:
State’s Intentional Delay or
Negligence

State’s Negligence or Overcrowded
Courts

Prisoner’s Legitimate Use of Legal
Process

Favorable to State:
Valid Reasons (e.g., missing witness)

Favorable to State:
Prisoner’s Abuse of Legal Process

As the above chart depicts, the state’s intentional delay and
negligence producing delay are treated the same by both Barker
and Justice Stevens—against the state.229 While Barker does not
specifically address a defendant’s abuse of legal process,
presumably that would constitute a valid reason (as cited by the
state) for delay. If so, Barker and Justice Stevens would possibly
be in agreement that a defendant/prisoner’s abuse of legal process
would be favorable to the state. The crucial area of disagreement
between Justice Stevens and both Justice Thomas and nearly all
courts is a prisoner’s legitimate use of legal process. Justice
Stevens maintains that delay for that reason favors the prisoner
and disfavors the state; Justice Thomas and nearly all courts
maintain the opposite. As to this crucial issue, Barker is silent.
But post-Barker decisions are consistent not with Justice
Stevens’s view but rather the view of Justice Thomas and courts
rejecting Lackey claims—“delay caused by the defense weighs
against the defendant.”230 Pretrial delay caused by the
defendant’s actions, even legitimate ones, are attributed to the
228. See supra text accompanying notes 120–121 (explaining Justice
Stevens’s comments on prisoner responsibility). Note that for Justice Stevens,
these three reasons for delay only “may” or “arguably” have constitutional
significance. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995).
229. See supra Table 1 (comparing the treatment of reasons for delay in the
speedy trial right context with Lackey claim reasons for delay as articulated by
Justice Stevens).
230. Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009).
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defendant, categorized as a “valid reason”231 under Barker,232 and
undercut a speedy trial right violation claim.233 As the Fifth
Circuit in Divers v. Cain234 declared, delays “‘attributable to the
conduct of the defendant weigh in favor of the state.’”235 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Loud Hawk236 provided the
following explanation for the rule: “‘Having sought the aid of the
judicial process and realizing the deliberateness that a court
employs in reaching a decision, the defendants are now not able
to criticize the very process which they so frequently called
upon.’”237 In essence, this is the prisoner fault argument. By
choosing to pursue legal processes, which necessarily take some
time to resolve, the defendant or prisoner cannot complain of the
resulting delay.238
The following chart, comparing the treatment of speedy trial
right reasons for delay post-Barker and the treatment of

231. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
232. Id.; see, e.g., Speedy Trial, supra note 207, at 424 (“Delays resulting
from valid reasons such as . . . defendant’s actions do not weigh against the
government at all.”).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 2011)
(finding that “much of the delay in her case was attributable to her own actions”
including filing over fifty documents requiring hearings and responses, and thus
did not weigh against the state); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630–31
(7th Cir. 2010) (attributing delays to defendants for continuances requested by
defendants, proceedings disqualifying defense counsel, defendants’ motion to
proceed pro se, and a hearing requested by defendants’ challenging
government’s compliance with discovery requirements); United States v. Hall,
551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (characterizing “pre-trial proceedings largely
resulting from defense motions” as a valid basis for delay and not attributable to
the state); United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2008)
(finding that most of the delay stemmed from actions of the defendant and
concluding that this weighed against the defendant).
234. 68 F.3d 211 (2012).
235. Id. at 218 (2012) (quoting Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 207 (5th Cir.
2011)).
236. 474 U.S. 302 (1986).
237. Id. at 316–17 (quoting United States v. Auerbach, 420 F.2d 921, 924
(5th Cir. 1969)).
238. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reasoning that when a
petitioner chooses to delay execution by using available post-conviction review
processes, the resulting delay is his own fault).

THE IRRELEVANCE OF PRISONER FAULT

43

execution delays by Justice Thomas and nearly all lower courts,
is as follows:
Table 2
Speedy Trial Right Reasons for Delay
(Post-Barker)

Lackey Claim Reasons for Delay
(Justice Thomas/lower courts)

Favorable to Defendant:

Favorable to Prisoner:

State’s Intentional Delay

State’s Intentional Delay or
Negligence

State’s Negligence or Overcrowded
Courts
Favorable to State:

Favorable to State:

Valid reasons (e.g., missing witness,
defendant’s abuse or legitimate use of
legal process)

Prisoner’s Abuse of Legal Process

Prisoner’s Legitimate Use of Legal
Process

As the above chart shows, the assessments of whether the
reasons for delay favor the state or the defendant/prisoner are
nearly identical in the speedy trial and Lackey claim contexts.239
The assessments of the reasons for delay in the speedy trial
context post-Barker are now more consistent with the view of
Justice Thomas and nearly all lower courts than with the view of
Justice Stevens.240 Most importantly, the post-Barker assessment
of a defendant’s legitimate use of legal process is consistent with
the Justice Thomas/lower courts view.241 A defendant/prisoner’s
legitimate use of legal process that causes delay is attributed to
the defendant.242
239. See supra Table 2 (indicating that a state’s intentional delay or
negligence is favorable to the defendant, whereas a defendant’s abuse or use of
legal process favors the state).
240. See supra notes 232–237, Table 2, and accompanying text (maintaining
that delays resulting from defendant’s actions do not weigh against the
government, but that intentional delays or those resulting from negligence do).
241. See supra notes 232–237, Table 2, and accompanying text (choosing to
pursue legal processes of appellate and collateral review undermines a
defendant’s basis to complain of the resulting delay).
242. See supra note 233, Table 2, and accompanying text (reasoning that the
resulting delay is a product of the defendant’s actions).
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As a result, analogizing to the speedy trial right may provide
some basis for the prisoner fault argument for rejecting Lackey
claims. More specifically, the second factor (reason for delay) of
the Barker four-factor test for evaluating speedy trial right
violation claims, as interpreted by post-Barker courts, may be
analogous to and provide some support for courts rejecting Lackey
claims on the basis of attribution of the delay to the prisoner. If
speedy trial right violation claims and Lackey claims are
sufficiently analogous, then the relevance of defendant fault for
delay between accusation and commencement of trial may make
relevant prisoner fault for delay between sentence and execution.
And if a defendant’s responsibility for delaying trial undercuts a
Sixth Amendment speedy trial right violation claim, then
similarly a death row prisoner’s responsibility for delaying
execution undercuts an Eighth Amendment Lackey claim.
C. Difficulties for Prisoner Fault Argument
Having located a seemingly plausible rationale for the
prisoner fault argument in the analysis of claims of speedy trial
right violations, the issue now becomes whether the speedy trial
right analogy helps more than it hurts. This subpart presents
three reasons why it may hurt more than help. First, reliance on
the speedy trial analogy presupposes and concedes the existence
of a prisoner’s right to expeditious execution.243 Denying Lackey
claims (of violation of Eighth Amendment right against execution
following lengthy periods of death row incarceration), based on
the failure to satisfy a factor or requirement (reason for delay) of
that right implies the existence of that right, even if only in
principle.244 Second, the contextual approach of Barker is
inconsistent with the categorical approach of courts rejecting
Lackey claims.245 Under the contextual approach of Barker, at
243. See infra Part III.C.1 (rejecting a claim of right-violation for failing to
satisfy a factor or requirement of that right logically entails the existence of that
very right).
244. See infra Part III.C.1 (explaining that the Speedy Trial Right analogy
ultimately presupposes the existence of the right to a timely execution).
245. See infra Part III.C.2 (noting that Barker requires a flexible, “ad hoc,”
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least occasionally Lackey claimants would prevail.246 Third, the
analogy makes not just one factor of the Barker four factor test
relevant, but all four of the factors.247 Lackey claimants may
satisfy enough of the factors to prevail.248
The above three subparts accept the analogy but point out its
limitations and, moreover, argue that it may help Lackey claims
more than hurt. These three objections are animated by the view
that if courts rejecting Lackey claims are to analogize to the
speedy trial right, and benefit from the advantages of that
analogy, they must incur the disadvantages of that analogy as
well. They cannot selectively cherry-pick among the aspects of the
speedy trial right analysis that are favorable and disregard
unfavorable aspects. If the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right
analysis and Eighth Amendment Lackey claim analysis are truly
analogous, then other aspects of the Sixth Amendment speedy
trial right analysis beyond just the second factor (reason for
delay) may also be relevant to Eighth Amendment Lackey claim
analysis. Those other aspects and factors pose some difficulties
for courts rejecting Lackey claims.
1. Speedy Trial Right Analogy Presupposes Existence of Right to
Timely Execution
While analogizing to the speedy trial right analysis may
explain the relevance of prisoner fault and supply a rationale for
the prisoner fault argument, this relevance and rationale comes
at a price. The price is that reliance on the analogy presupposes
and concedes the existence of a right against excessively delayed
executions. Denying a speedy trial right violation claim because,
at least in part, the defendant caused the delay presupposes and
concedes the existence of a right to a speedy trial within the Sixth
and “highly contextual inquiry”).
246. See infra Part III.C.2 (explaining that Barker’s approach is inconsistent
with the approach of courts that reject Lackey claims).
247. See infra Part III.C.3 (notwithstanding a conclusion attributing
responsibility for the delay to the prisoner, the other three Barker factors may
provide the basis for a Lackey claim).
248. For further explanation, see infra Part III.C.3.
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Amendment.249 Similarly, denying a Lackey claim because the
defendant caused the delay presupposes and concedes the right to
an expeditious execution within the Eighth Amendment. To reject
a claim of right-violation for the failure to satisfy a factor or
requirement of that right surely entails the existence of that very
right. Thus, to reject a Lackey claim of right-violation (that the
Eighth Amendment right against execution following lengthy
death row incarceration was violated) because the prisoner failed
to satisfy a factor or requirement (reason for delay) of that right
surely entails the existence of that very right. It is incongruous to
reject a claim of right-violation for failing to satisfy a factor or
requirement of that right while denying the very existence of that
right. Yet Justice Thomas and courts rejecting Lackey claims
have never explicitly acknowledged the right, even in principle, to
a timely execution and strongly deny the existence of such a
right.250 One cannot establish the non-existence of a right by
pointing out that the prisoner fails to satisfy a factor or
requirement of the right. As a result, reliance on the analogy
establishes the existence of a right under the Eighth Amendment
against execution following a lengthy period of death row
incarceration.
2. Barker’s Contextual Approach Inconsistent with Categorical
Approach of Courts Rejecting Lackey Claims
The very method employed by the Barker test for assessing
claims of speedy trial right violations is inconsistent with the
approach taken by courts rejecting Lackey claims. Barker
eschewed any “rigid,”251 “bright-line rule”252 in favor of a
249. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .”).
250. See supra notes 53 and 161–164 and accompanying text (illustrating
that Justice Thomas finds Lackey claims lack constitutional foundation in every
instance).
251. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972).
252. See United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 709 (2011) (applying
Barker does “not impose a bright-line rule” (citing United States v. ErenasLuna, 560 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e have not held that a bright line
exists . . . .”))).
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flexible,253 “ad hoc,”254 “highly contextual inquiry.”255 Under a
rigid test, we would expect defendants not meeting the
requirements to be categorically barred from prevailing, but
under the fact-intensive and case-by-case approach of Barker,
sometimes defendants would prevail and sometimes they would
not.256 Until very recently, however, no federal court had ever
recognized a Lackey claim.257 Currently, no appellate court—state
or federal—recognizes a Lackey claim.258 Courts have rejected
Lackey claims categorically rather than contextually.259 Courts
rejecting Lackey claims typically cite that there is simply no
precedent for recognizing a Lackey claim.260 Such an approach is
hardly consistent with an ad hoc, highly contextual inquiry. Were
the analogy between the speedy trial right analysis and Lackey
claim analysis to hold, courts would have to employ a contextual,
not categorical, approach and, at least occasionally, recognize
Lackey claims.
253. United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 314 (1986) (referring to the
“flexibility” of the Barker test).
254. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
255. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 670 n.5 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
256. See infra Part III.C.3 (asserting that application of Barker’s four-factor
balancing test would support recognition of Lackey claims in certain
circumstances).
257. See supra text accompanying note 37 (indicating that the first such
claim was recognized in July 2014).
258. See supra notes 161, 164 and infra note 260 (listing numerous
instances and the attendant reasoning of courts rejecting Lackey claims).
259. See Newton, supra note 17, at 62 (characterizing Justice Thomas’s view
as “the Lackey claim categorically lacks merit”).
260. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sec’y Dept. Corr., 517 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir.
2008) (“Especially given the total absence of Supreme Court precedent . . . we
conclude that execution following a 31-year term of imprisonment is not itself a
constitutional violation.”); Reed v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 465, 488 (5th Cir.
2007) (“‘No other circuit has found that inordinate delay in carrying out an
execution violates the condemned prisoner’s eighth amendment rights.’”
(quoting White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 436 (5th Cir. 1996))); People v. Vines,
251 P.3d 943, 988–89 (Cal. 2011) (“‘[W]e have consistently concluded . . . that
delay . . . is not a basis for concluding that either the death penalty itself, or the
process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual punishment.’” (quoting
People v. Brown, 93 P.3d 244, 260 (Cal. 2004))); Valle v. State, 70 So. 3d 530,
552 (Fla. 2011) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly held this [Lackey] claim to be
meritless.”).
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3. Applying Entire Speedy Trial Right Analysis Supports Lackey
Claim
Reliance on the analogy to the speedy trial right to supply a
rationale for the relevance of prisoner fault makes not just one
factor of the Barker test relevant to Lackey claims but potentially
all four factors. Even if the second Barker factor—attribution of
responsibility for the delay—cuts against the prisoner, the other
three factors may support a Lackey claim. If so, despite the
analogy possibly serving as a rationale supporting the relevance
of prisoner fault, the analogy would only further support the
recognition of Lackey claims. That is, the cost of the relevance of
prisoner fault is the recognition of Lackey claims based on their
satisfaction of the Barker four-factor balancing test.
a. First Factor: Length of Delay
The sheer length of delays found constitutional in Lackey
claims dwarf the length of delays found unconstitutional in
speedy trial right violation claims.261 In Barker, the Supreme
Court termed the delay of over five years to be “extraordinary,”262
and in Doggett v. United States, the Court held that a delay of
over eight years, even in the absence of particularized evidence of
prejudice to the defendant, constituted a violation263 and was
“extraordinary.”264 If delays of five years and eight years are
extraordinary, then the delays of upwards of thirty years and
more in Lackey claims must be “supra-extraordinary.” As a
result, this first factor—length of delay—would clearly favor the
prisoner, not the state, and support recognition of a Lackey claim.
261. Compare Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116–17 (2009)
(illuminating Justice Thomas’s position that even delays of thirty-two years do
not create Eighth Amendment problems), with Doggett v. United States, 505
U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992) (maintaining that an eight-year delay was
unconstitutional).
262. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 (1972).
263. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657–58 (1992) (“[T]he delay
attributable to the Government’s negligence far exceeds the threshold needed to
state a speedy trial claim.”).
264. Id. at 652.
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b. Second Factor: Reason for Delay
Although the second factor seemingly weighs against the
Lackey claimant because of the rule that a defendant’s actions
that cause delay are “ordinarily” attributed to the defendant,265
this rule is not absolute. The Supreme Court in Loud Hawk,
regarding delays caused by an interlocutory appeal brought by
the defendant, conceded that “an unreasonable delay caused by
the prosecution in that appeal, or a wholly unjustifiable delay by
the appellate court” could be attributed not to the defendant but
to the state.266 In the latest Supreme Court case addressing the
speedy trial right, Vermont v. Brillon,267 the Court ruled that
“delay caused by the defendant’s counsel is also charged against
the defendant.”268 However, the Court cautioned that this
“general rule . . . is not absolute,” and “[d]elay resulting from a
systemic ‘breakdown in the public defender system’ could be
charged to the state.”269 Similarly, the state could be charged
with any delays caused by “the trial court’s failure to appoint
counsel with dispatch.”270 Thus, the general rule that actions of
the defendant that cause delay are attributable to the defendant
contains the exception that undue delays caused by overburdened
prosecutors, overcrowded appellate dockets, or understaffed
public defender offices are attributable to the government.271 And
265. See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986) (“[W]here a
pretrial appeal by the defendant is appropriate . . . delays from such an appeal
ordinarily will not weigh in favor of a defendant’s speedy trial claims.”).
266. See id. at 315–16 (“[W]here a pretrial appeal by the defendant is
appropriate . . . delays from such an appeal ordinarily will not weigh in favor of
a defendant’s speedy trial claims.”).
267. 556 U.S. 81 (2009).
268. Id. at 91.
269. Id. at 94 (quoting Brillon v. Vermont, 955 A.2d 1108, 1111 (Vt. 2008)).
270. Id. at 85.
271. See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436 (1973) (“[D]elays caused
by overcrowded court dockets or understaffed prosecutors are among the
factors . . . [that must be attributed to the government] since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather
than with the defendant.”); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630 (7th Cir.
2010) (acknowledging that “delays resulting from a trial court’s schedule are
ultimately attributed to the government” (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
531 (1972))).
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this exception is consistent with Barker’s analysis that delays
caused by government “negligence or overcrowded courts” are not
attributable to the defendant.272 Rather, Barker explained, they
are to be attributed to the state because “ultimate responsibility
for such circumstances must rest with the government.”273
While the prisoner fault argument is consistent with the
general rule in speedy trial right analysis regarding attribution of
fault for delay, it is inconsistent with that general rule’s
exceptions.274 But if delayed trials and delayed executions are
sufficiently analogous, then the prisoner fault argument must
incorporate not only the general rule but the exceptions as well.
Just as delays caused by a defendant choosing to pursue pretrial
motions, interlocutory appeals, and requests for hearings
“ordinarily” do not count toward establishing a speedy trial
violation,275 so also a death row prisoner’s choosing to obtain
appellate and collateral review do not generally provide a basis to
complain of delayed execution.276 But just as delays due to
government negligence, overcrowded courts, or systemic
breakdown are attributable to the state in the speedy trial
context, so also any delays caused by government negligence due
to overcrowded courts or systemic breakdown in the Lackey claim
context would be attributed to the state.277 Is there any evidence

272. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S 514, 531 (1972) (finding that
overcrowding and negligence are more neutral reasons for delay than deliberate
interference with the defense, but that responsibility still lies with the
government).
273. Id.
274. See supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text (explaining that the
general rule that defendant actions causing delay are attributable to defendant
contains the exception that undue delays caused by overburdened courts or
government negligence are attributable to the state).
275. See supra notes 232–237, Table 2, and accompanying text (explaining
that delays resulting from such actions do not typically weigh against the
government).
276. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting that pursuit of postconviction legal processes necessarily entails a measure of delay as they take
considerable time to resolve, so the resulting delay cannot be complained of).
277. See supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text (emphasizing that
delays caused by government negligence and systemic breakdown are
attributable to the state, not the defendant).
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of such government negligence or systemic breakdown in
America’s capital punishment system?
According to Jones v. Chappell, the evidence is ample.278
Jones found evidence of widespread systemic dysfunction in
California’s administration of the death penalty:
Most death row inmates wait between three and five years for
counsel to be appointed for their direct appeal . . . . [A]nother
two to three years are spent waiting for oral argument to be
scheduled before the California Supreme Court. On state
habeas review . . . at least eight to ten years elapse between
the
death
verdict
and
appointment
of
habeas
counsel. . . . Then, after state habeas briefs are submitted,
another four years elapse before the California Supreme Court
issues a generally conclusory denial of the inmate’s claims. 279

The court concluded that “[t]hese delays—exceeding 25 years
on average—are inherent to California’s dysfunctional death
penalty system, not the result of individual inmates’ delay tactics,
except perhaps in isolated cases.”280 The structural, systemic
delay described by Jones clearly satisfies the exception,
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Loud Hawk and Brillon,
that delays caused by government negligence and systemic
breakdown are attributable not to the defendant, but to the
state.281 Jones provides authority that Lackey claimants might
well satisfy the second Barker factor—reason for the delay.282 And
Jones is not alone.283 Despite prisoners choosing to pursue
278. See Jones v. Chappell, 2014 WL 3567365, at *1–6 (C.D. Cal. July 16,
2014) (detailing the facts giving rise to California’s violation of Jones’s Eighth
Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment and the
unconstitutionality of California’s death penalty system).
279. Id. at *12.
280. Id.
281. See supra notes 266–272 and accompanying text (attributing
responsibility for the breakdown in the criminal administration of the criminal
justice system to the government).
282. See Jones, 2014 WL 3567365, at *1–6 (finding systemic dysfunction in
the administration of California’s death penalty as resulting from government
failure rather than individual inmates’ delay tactics).
283. See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 1116 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
respecting denial of certiorari) (internal citations omitted) (“[Due to states’
failures and defective procedures] [t]he reversible error rate in capital trials is
staggering. More than 30 percent of death verdicts imposed between 1973 and
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appellate and collateral review that cause execution delays, which
“ordinarily” would be attributed to the prisoner, the delay might be
attributed to the state because of negligence and systemic
breakdown.
c. Third Factor: Defendant’s Assertion of Right
It is not entirely clear how this third factor applies in the
delayed execution context. True, many Lackey claimants fail to
assert their claim until they have already been on death row for
many years.284 On that basis, this third factor may militate against
recognition of a Lackey claim. However, one commentator suggests
that this third factor does not analogously translate to the delayed
execution context: “Not all of the Barker factors apply with full force
in the context of inordinate delay. It is nonsensical to require that
the capital defendant insist that the state rush to execute him. If the
defendant was sincere in such demands, he could almost always
‘volunteer’ to be executed.”285 Another possible difficulty with
applying the third factor to the delayed execution context is that
penalizing a prisoner for failing to assert a right that until July 2014
2000 have been overturned, and 129 inmates sentenced to death during that
time have been exonerated.”); Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 986 (2007)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (observing that “much of the
delay at issue [thirty years] seems due to constitutionally defective sentencing
proceedings”); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 993 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“The length of this confinement [twenty-seven years]
has resulted partly from the State’s repeated procedural errors.”); Knight v.
Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 993 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (characterizing the delays as stemming from “the State’s own failure
to comply with the Constitution’s demands”); Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944,
944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting that the
prisoner “has experienced that delay [twenty-three years] because of the State’s
own faulty procedures”).
284. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 1067, 1071 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in denial of certiorari) (“Petitioner . . . for all his current complaints
about delay [of twenty-eight years], did not raise a Lackey objection to the speed
of his proceedings in the 1999 habeas petition he filed 18 years into his tenure
on death row.”); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting
that prisoner’s Lackey claim involving a delay of twenty years could have been
brought one to nine years earlier).
285. Aarons, Inordinate Delay, supra note 188, at 207.
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no American jurisdiction or court recognized286 seems unfair and
inappropriate. In Doggett, the Court did not weigh the third factor
against the defendant despite his failure to assert his right to a
speedy trial until over eight years after his indictment.287 The Court
reasoned that the defendant was unaware of the indictment and
would have had no reason to assert a speedy trial right.288 Not only
is the death row prisoner unaware of the recognition of a right to a
timely execution, but moreover, the death row prisoner is unaware
of that right because in every court except one, that right does not
exist.289 A prisoner cannot be faulted for failing to assert a right that
he is not only unaware of, but also does not exist. Were courts to
recognize the right, in principle, and explicitly state that defendant’s
early and repeated assertion of the right is a factor to be considered,
Lackey claimants would have little difficulty satisfying this factor.
d. Fourth Factor: Prejudice to Defendant
This fourth factor clearly favors Lackey claimants. The Lackey
claimant satisfies two of the three forms of prejudice that the speedy
trial right serves to protect.290 Incarceration on death row under
horrific conditions for upwards of thirty years or more clearly
constitutes “oppressive . . . incarceration”291 and causes “anxiety and
concern,”292 as evidenced by the high rate of insanity293 and
286. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting that Jones v.
Chappell is the first federal decision recognizing a Lackey claim).
287. See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 653–54 (1992) (“[D]oggett is
not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest.”).
288. See id. (“[H]e was subjected neither to pretrial detention nor . . . to
awareness of unresolved charges against him.”).
289. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (explaining that the United
States District Court for the Central District of California is the exception as of
July 2014).
290. See supra note 213 and accompanying text (explaining that the aim is
to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration and minimize the anxiety and
concern of the accused).
291. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972).
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a death
sentence is not a rare phenomenon.”).
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suicide.294 The third form of prejudice—to the prisoner’s
defense295—is not clearly satisfied. Not every Lackey claimant can
persuasively establish that the delay impaired his defense, but
probably some could.296 But there is no requirement that a
defendant establish all three forms of prejudice in order to obtain
the support of the prejudice factor.297 By clearly satisfying two of
the three forms of prejudice and possibly satisfying the third, the
fourth factor clearly supports recognition of a Lackey claim.298
294. See, e.g., Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting
from denial of stay) (“In Lackey and in Knight Justice Stevens and I referred to
the legal sources, in addition to studies of attempted suicide, that buttress the
commonsense conclusion that 33 years in prison under threat of execution is
cruel.”).
295. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 532 (noting that the third form of prejudice that
the speedy trial right is designed to protect against is the possibility that the
defense will be impaired).
296. See Root, supra note 188, at 322 (“In making the analogy [from speedy
trial right claims] to excessive delays associated with capital appeals, each of
these types of prejudice are clearly present.”).
297. See, e.g., Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992) (finding a
speedy trial violation and satisfaction of the fourth factor despite the defendant
only claiming one of the three forms of prejudice).
298. True, Barker considered prejudice to the defendant’s defense the most
important form of prejudice. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 654 (“Of these forms of
prejudice, ‘the most serious is the last [prejudice to the defendant’s defense],
because the inability of a defendant to adequately prepare his defense skews the
fairness of the entire system.’” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532)). That Lackey
claimants would satisfy this most important form of prejudice less often than
they would satisfy lesser forms of prejudice, however, would not prevent the
prejudice factor from supporting Lackey claimants for two reasons. First, as
discussed above, the longer the delay, the greater the presumption of prejudice,
the less need to demonstrate particularized evidence of prejudice, and the
greater the weight of the prejudice factor as compared to other factors. See
supra notes 220–221 and accompanying text (discussing the prejudice factor).
Second, if the delay is sufficiently lengthy, the length of the delay alone suffices
to establish prejudice. Extreme delay “‘allow[s] the delay itself to constitute
prejudice.’” United States v. Larson, 627 F.3d 1198, 1209 (10th Cir. 2010)
(quoting United States v. Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170, 1180 n.3 (10th Cir. 2010)). “In
cases of extreme delay, the defendant may rely on the presumption of prejudice
and need not present specific evidence of prejudice.” Larson, 627 F.3d at 1209;
accord United States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 706 (6th Cir. 2011) (“‘[E]xtreme’
delays may, on their own, ‘give rise to a strong presumption of evidentiary
prejudice.’” (quoting United States v. Smith, 94 F.3d 204, 209 (6th Cir. 1996))).
In calculating whether a delay constitutes an extreme delay, courts consider
both the total length of delay as well as the length of delay attributable to the
government. In Doggett, the Supreme Court found a total delay of eight years,
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e. Balancing the Four Factors
Balancing and weighing these four factors support
recognition of Lackey claims. A prisoner would clearly satisfy the
length of delay and prejudice factors and possibly satisfy the
assertion of the right and reason for the delay factors. Viewing
these factors most favorably to the state, the reason for the delay
and assertion of the right factors favor the state, but the length of
delay and prejudice factors would still strongly favor the prisoner.
With the prejudice factor of substantially greater weight than the
other factors due to the “supra-extraordinary” delay, the factors
still support recognition of a Lackey claim.
IV. Waiver of Eighth Amendment Right
Part III considered analogizing to the speedy trial right
analysis for the missing rationale of the prisoner fault argument.
The analogy seems attractive because delayed trials and delayed
executions share an obvious parallel. More importantly,
defendants’ actions causing delays in trials are ordinarily
attributed to defendants just as the prisoner fault argument
attributes to prisoners delays in executions caused by their
with six of those years attributable to the government, sufficiently extreme as to
constitute prejudice. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 657–58. And the Third Circuit found a
total delay of less than four years, with less than three years attributable to the
government, to be sufficiently extreme to constitute prejudice. United States v.
Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 682–83 (2009). In contrast, the length of delays in Lackey
claims—upwards of thirty years or more—substantially exceeds the length of
delays found sufficiently extreme in speedy trial right violation claims so as to
constitute prejudice.
In addition, Justice Thomas forcefully argued that not only is prejudice to
the defendant’s defense a less important form of prejudice, it may not be a form
of prejudice that is cognizable at all under the speedy trial right. He maintained
that “‘the Speedy Trial Clause’s core concern is impairment of liberty.’” Doggett,
505 U.S. at 660 (dissenting) (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302,
312 (1986)). Justice Thomas explained that “prejudice to the defense is not the
sort of impairment of liberty against which the Clause is directed.” Doggett, 505
U.S. at 661. Rather, “‘[t]he speedy trial guarantee is designed to minimize the
possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial.’” Id. (quoting United States v.
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)). As a result, Justice Thomas would be
constrained in objecting to any failure of Lackey claimants to satisfy this harm
to the defense form of prejudice.
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actions. But even if the analogy does supply the missing
relevance of prisoner fault, rather than undercutting Lackey
claims, the analogy ultimately provides further support to Lackey
claims for three reasons. First, the analogy presupposes the
existence of the very right that courts rejecting Lackey claims
strenuously deny.299 Second, the contextual method of assessing
claims of speedy trial rights violations, as opposed to courts
categorically barring Lackey claims, when applied to Lackey
claims would yield more favorable outcomes for prisoners.300
Third, Lackey claimants would likely prevail when not only the
reason for delay factor but all four factors of the speedy trial right
analysis were applied to their claims.301
With a helpful rationale for the prisoner fault argument still
elusive, this Part explores another obvious candidate—waiver. By
choosing to seek appellate and collateral review, which delays
execution, death row prisoners thereby waive their right under
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause against execution following a lengthy period of death row
incarceration. Although most courts rejecting Lackey claims
invoke the prisoner fault argument,302 perhaps only the Supreme
Court of Utah, in Gardner v. State,303 has explicitly characterized
it in terms of waiver: “[S]ome courts considering . . . Lackey
claims have disposed of the claims on the ground of waiver. That
is, because executions are delayed as a result of a petitioner’s
decision to invoke legal process, it is incongruous to hold that the
time consumed by the process makes the petitioner’s sentence
unconstitutional.”304
299. See supra Part III.C.1 (noting that courts rejecting Lackey claims deny
the existence of an Eighth Amendment right against execution following lengthy
death row incarceration).
300. See supra notes 251–255 and accompanying text (maintaining that
faithful application of the Barker’s fact-intensive approach would lead some
defendants to prevail in asserting Lackey claims).
301. See supra Part III.C.1 (indicating that application of the entire Speedy
Trial Right analysis supports Lackey claims).
302. See supra notes 47, 161–164 and accompanying text (identifying the
prisoner fault argument as the basis for reflexive denial of Lackey claims by
lower courts).
303. 234 P.3d 1115 (Utah 2010).
304. See id. at 1143 (“Although [the petitioner] was entitled to make the
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Part IV examines whether waiver might supply the
underlying rationale for the prisoner fault argument. First, this
Part supplies a brief overview of waiver of constitutional rights in
general.305 Second, it discusses the extent of, and limitations on,
the constitutionality of waiver of the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.306 Third, this
Part presents six difficulties with the waiver rationale for the
prisoner fault argument.307 It concludes that the waiver rationale
is unpersuasive.308 Moreover, rather than providing a rationale
for the prisoner fault argument, the waiver rationale provides
further support for Lackey claims. There are sound reasons why
nearly all courts denying Lackey claims, despite making waiverlike arguments, decline to explicitly base the prisoner fault
argument on waiver.
A. Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Generally
Constitutional rights are generally susceptible to waiver.309
For example, the Supreme Court held that one may waive the
Fourth Amendment right to be free from “unreasonable searches
and seizures”310 by consenting to a search lacking probable
motion and amend his federal petition, he cannot now claim that the delay
caused by his actions constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.” (citing Johns
v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 547 (8th Cir. 2000))); Richmond v. Lewis, 948 F.2d
1473, 1491–92 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A petitioner should not be able to benefit from
the ultimately unsuccessful pursuit [of his] constitutional rights.”).
305. Infra Part IV.A.
306. Infra Part IV.B.
307. Infra Part IV.C.
308. Infra Part IV.C.
309. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801,
801 (2003) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recognized that criminal defendants may
waive various constitutional protections . . . . Indeed, these criminal protections
are routinely bargained away.”); Daniel R. Williams, Mitigation and the Capital
Defendant Who Wants to Die: A Study in the Rhetoric of Autonomy and the
Hidden Discourse of Collective Responsibility, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 693, 702 (2006)
(“[W]aivers of constitutional rights are commonplace. You are free to say thanks,
but no thanks to the most basic and precious of constitutional rights . . . . We
live in a legal culture where waivers of constitutional rights flourish.”).
310. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
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cause.311 One may waive the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination312 by voluntarily confessing.313 One
may waive the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial314 by
requesting a bench trial.315 One may waive the Sixth Amendment
right to the assistance of counsel316 by opting to self-represent.317
One may waive the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s
accusers318 by pleading guilty.319 These are just a sampling of the
many constitutional rights that may be waived.
Not all constitutional rights may be so readily waived. The
Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery.320 In effect, this creates
a constitutional right not to be enslaved. Could this right not to
be enslaved be waived? That is, by choosing to work for free and
to be the property of another does one waive the protection of the
Thirteenth Amendment thereby making one’s enslavement
constitutional? Surely no. The First Amendment guarantees
freedom of speech, the press, association, and religious
affiliation.321 Could these First Amendment rights be waived? As
seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
311. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973) (recognizing
that one may waive his Fourth Amendment right if consent is voluntarily
given).
312. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
313. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (enumerating the
rights waived when a defendant enters a guilty plea, among them the privilege
against self-incrimination).
314. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
315. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (“[A] defendant
can . . . in some instances waive his right to a trial by jury.”).
316. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
317. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975) (“The Sixth
Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the
accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”).
318. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .”).
319. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (noting that the right
to confront one’s accusers is waived by entering a guilty plea).
320. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (“Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . . .”).
321. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
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Jason Mazzone explains, “the Court has held that other
provisions of the Constitution [that is, not the 4th, 5th, and 6th
Amendments], particularly First Amendment rights, may not
generally be waived.”322 As to waiver, is the Eighth Amendment
more like the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments that
generally allow waiver or is it more like the First and Thirteenth
Amendments that generally do not?
B. Support for Prisoner Fault Argument
At least to some extent, courts accept waiver of Eighth
Amendment rights in some contexts. In so-called volunteer
execution cases, a convicted capital offender may decline (nonmandatory) appellate and collateral review of her capital
sentence, thereby waiving her Eighth Amendment (as well as
other) rights.323 For example, convicted capital offender Gary
Gilmore declined appellate review, declaring that he wished to be
executed immediately.324 Gilmore’s mother petitioned the
Supreme Court for a stay of execution but the Court upheld
Gilmore’s waiver.325 Courts have also treated defendants’ choice
not to present mitigating evidence as waiving the ability to
challenge the subsequent capital sentence based on the jury’s
failure to consider mitigating evidence.326 The choice is construed
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble . . . .”).
322. Mazzone, supra note 309, at 801.
323. See Williams, supra note 309, at 697 n.20 (“The Supreme Court has
never been receptive to the argument that this form of volunteering is
constitutionally troublesome.”); LINDA CARTER ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 371 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that “between 1976 and May 2011, 133
individuals were executed who were considered ‘volunteers’”).
324. See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1015 n.4 (1976) (“At a hearing on
November 1, 1976, on a motion for a new trial, Gilmore's attorneys informed the
trial court that they had been told by Gilmore not to file an appeal and not to
seek a stay of execution of sentence on his behalf.”).
325. See id. at 1013 (“[T]he Court is convinced that Gary Mark Gilmore
made a knowing and intelligent waiver of any and all federal rights he might
have asserted after the Utah trial court’s sentence was imposed . . . .”).
326. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 469, 481 (2007) (holding
that interfering with counsel’s attempt to present mitigating evidence at capital
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as the defendant waiving the Eighth Amendment protections that
capital punishment is cruel and unusual without the jury
considering mitigating evidence suggesting that the defendant is
not death-worthy.327
Until recently, courts refused to recognize waivers of Eighth
Amendment rights involving the type of punishment. Consider
the punishment of banishment, which the Supreme Court in Trop
v. Dulles328 held is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.329 If a defendant is given the choice of imprisonment
or banishment, and the defendant chooses banishment, does the
defendant’s choice constitute a waiver thereby transforming
banishment into a constitutional punishment for that defendant?
Courts have said no; a defendant’s choice does not transform an
unconstitutional punishment into a constitutional one.330 In Dear
sentencing hearing waived defendant’s right to claim ineffective counsel based
on the failure to present mitigating evidence despite Eighth Amendment
guarantee that a jury have the opportunity to consider mitigating evidence
before imposing a capital sentence).
327. See Jules Epstein, Mandatory Mitigation: An Eighth Amendment
Mandate to Require Presentation of Mitigation Evidence, Even When the
Sentencing Trial Defendant Wishes to Die, 21 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7
(2011) (“[C]ourts have nationally placed few barriers in the path of a defendant
who seeks to waive the presentation of mitigation evidence, and in virtually
every instance has done so without reference to Eighth Amendment principles
or concerns.”).
328. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
329. See id. at 100–01 (“We believe, as . . . the court below, that use of
denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment.”).
330. See Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360–61 (W.D. Va.
1979) (“Banishment was a condition voluntarily and knowingly agreed to by
petitioner in this course of the plea bargain negotiations, although for reasons
outlined below, this court holds that the condition is unenforceable.”); Henry v.
State, 280 S.E.2d 536, 536 (S.C. 1981) (“[T]he trial judge was without authority
to impose banishment from the State as a condition of prohibition, even if
appellant agreed to the sentence.”). But see Carchedi v. Rhodes, 560 F. Supp.
1010, 1016 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (ruling that prisoner’s acceptance of banishment as
a condition for obtaining early parole by clemency from the governor constituted
a waiver of right to challenge the constitutionality of the banishment condition).
Carchedi’s holding, however, may be limited to parolees. See Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, Let’s Make a Deal: Waiving the Eighth Amendment by Selecting a
Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 32 CONN. L. REV. 615, 635 (2000)
(distinguishing Carchedi from other non-parole cases). The court premised its
decision on the principle that “the government may impose upon the parolee
certain conditions of liberty which would be unconstitutional if applied to
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Wing Jung v. United States,331 the Ninth Circuit considered the
constitutionality of a sentence giving the defendant a choice
between imprisonment and banishment.332 Finding the sentence
unconstitutional, the court “rejected the argument that the
government may cloak unconstitutional punishments in the
mantle of ‘choice.’”333 Courts have similarly disallowed waivers
regarding a wide variety of punishments.334
But the 1999 Supreme Court decision Stewart v. LaGrand335
opened the door to the constitutionality of waivers regarding type
of punishment. Pursuant to Arizona’s choice of method of
execution option, convicted capital offender Walter LaGrand
chose lethal gas instead of lethal injection.336 On a habeas
challenge to lethal gas as cruel and unusual punishment violative
of the Eighth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit rejected Arizona’s
argument that LaGrand waived his claim by choosing lethal gas:
“‘Eighth Amendment protections may not be waived, at least in
the area of capital punishment.’”337 Because lethal gas had
previously been held unconstitutional in the Ninth Circuit and
LaGrand’s choice did not constitute a valid waiver, the Ninth
Circuit enjoined Arizona from executing LaGrand by lethal gas.338
ordinary individuals.” Carchedi, 560 F. Supp. at 1015.
331. 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962).
332. See id. at 75–76 (“The court having imposed a lawful imprisonment
then suspended the sentence for six months upon the condition that the
defendant depart from the United States.”).
333. Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 680 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (citing
Dear Wing Jung, 312 F.2d at 75–76).
334. See, e.g., id. at 680–81 (rejecting the State’s argument that the
defendant’s choice of hanging in preference to lethal injection waived Eighth
Amendment objection to hanging); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174,
180 (Pa. 1978) (“[W]e decline to apply the rationale of . . . [previous cases
accepting waivers on procedural grounds] in a situation where a finding of
waiver will result in the imposition of a sentence of death . . . in a manner
clearly contrary to the express law of the land.”); see also State v. Brown, 326
S.E.2d 410, 411–12 (S.C. 1985) (holding that allowing sexual offenders the
choice between imprisonment and castration is unconstitutional because
castration itself is cruel and unusual punishment).
335. 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (per curiam).
336. Id. at 119.
337. Id. at 117–18 (quoting LaGrand v. Stewart, 173 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th
Cir. 1999)).
338. Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on two grounds:
LaGrand’s claims were “procedurally defaulted,” and his Eighth
Amendment right was waived.339 As to waiver, the Court’s brief
analysis is as follows:
By declaring his method of execution, picking lethal gas over
the State’s default form of execution—lethal injection—Walter
LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst . . . . To hold otherwise, and to hold that
Eighth Amendment protections cannot be waived in the
capital context, would create and apply a new procedural rule
in violation of Teague v. Lane . . . .340

In dissent, Justice Stevens asserted, “whether a capital
defendant may consent to be executed by an unacceptably
torturous method of execution is by no means clear.”341
Referencing the unusual posture in which the Court heard the
case, Stevens declared, “I would not decide such an important
question without full briefing and argument.”342 Although the
Court has not revisited the issue, LaGrand is followed in the
lower courts, thereby precluding challenge to the constitutionality
of various methods of execution when chosen by the capital
offender pursuant to choice of method of execution statutes.343
Echoing Justice Stevens’s concerns, one might argue
LaGrand possibly undermines the fundamental principle that
waiver cannot transform an unconstitutional punishment into a
constitutional punishment. Though arguing that the protections
of the Eighth Amendment should not be subject to waiver,344
339. See id. at 119–20 (“By declaring his method of execution, picking lethal
gas over the State’s default form of execution—lethal injection—Walter
LaGrand has waived any objection he might have to it.”).
340. Id. at 119.
341. Id. at 121.
342. Id.
343. See generally Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less Than the Dignity of
Man: Evolving Standards, Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of
the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 393 (2003) (“Those courts
considering choice-of-method statutes after LaGrand have followed its dictates
without question.”).
344. See Kirchmeier, supra note 330, at 642 (arguing that there are “three
reasons why the Constitution does not allow defendants to waive the Eighth
Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment”).
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Jeffrey Kirchmeier raised the concern that LaGrand implied that
“[a]s long as defendants are given constitutional options, any
punishment would be constitutional when reformed through the
power of choice.”345 For example, “if a rape defendant may waive
his Eighth Amendment rights and be [surgically] castrated in
exchange for a lighter prison sentence, courts could allow thieves
to have their hands chopped off and Peeping Toms to have their
eyes gouged out.”346
Despite waiver of Eighth Amendment rights being more
limited than some other constitutional rights, and despite the
fundamental principle that waiver cannot transform a cruel and
unusual punishment into a humane and ordinary punishment,
LaGrand perhaps does provide support for waiver to serve as the
missing underlying rationale of the prisoner fault argument. The
next subpart, however, demonstrates that the waiver rationale is
ultimately unhelpful.
C. Difficulties for Prisoner Fault Argument
This subpart presents six difficulties with waiver serving as
the rationale for the prisoner fault argument. First, waiver
cannot make paradigmatically cruel and unusual punishments,
like torture, constitutional.347 Second, waiver cannot make
categorically death-ineligible offenders, like children, eligible for
capital punishment.348 Third, the scope of LaGrand’s precedential
authority may be limited.349 Fourth, even if the Eighth
Amendment is fully subject to waiver, Lackey claimants may be
unable to satisfy the standards for a legally valid waiver.350 Fifth,
and perhaps most fundamentally, waiver presupposes the
existence of the right being waived—a right the existence of
which Justice Thomas and nearly all lower courts strongly

345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Id. at 650.
Id.
Infra Part IV.C.1.
Infra Part IV.C.2.
Infra Part IV.C.3.
Infra Part IV.C.4.
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deny.351 Sixth, and perhaps of most practical significance, Justice
Thomas seems to reject the waiver rationale.352 The first three
difficulties present limitations on the scope of waiver of Eighth
Amendment rights that merely weaken waiver as a rationale for
the prisoner fault argument. The last three difficulties much
more strongly establish that waiver will not succeed as the
missing rationale.
1. Waiver Cannot Make Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Constitutional
Consider the paradigmatic examples of cruel and unusual
punishment: burning at the stake, disemboweling, drawing and
quartering, tarring and feathering, stoning, crucifying, being
pulled limb from limb, etc. Suppose a defendant was able to
choose one of these punishments. Under the logic of the prisoner
fault argument, the prisoner’s choice makes the prisoner
responsible for what the prisoner chooses. It thereby renders such
punishments unproblematic to impose on that prisoner. And
under the waiver basis for that argument, the prisoner would be
waiving her Eighth Amendment right against such otherwise
paradigmatically cruel and unusual punishments. Reliance on
the waiver rationale for the prisoner fault argument commits one
to the view that such barbaric punishments are constitutional for
such a defendant. But surely such punishments remain
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual even for a defendant who
has effected (or attempted to effect) a waiver.353 If we are unable
351. Infra Part IV.C.5.
352. Infra Part IV.C.6.
353. At least prior to LaGrand, the principle that waiver cannot transform
an unconstitutional punishment into a constitutional punishment enjoyed a
wide consensus. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 173 (1990) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (“Certainly a defendant’s consent to being drawn and quartered
or burned at the stake would not license the State to exact such punishments.”);
Lenhard v. Wolf, 444 U.S. 807, 811 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that society’s interest that cruel and unusual punishments not be
imposed “cannot be overridden by a [capital] defendant’s purported waiver” of
the right to trial); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1018 (1976) (White, J., joined
by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he consent of a convicted
defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a punishment
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to accept that waiver could transform paradigmatically cruel and
unusual punishment like torture into a constitutional
punishment, then perhaps waiver cannot transform an arguably
cruel and unusual punishment into a constitutional
punishment.354 If so, waiver as a rationale for the prisoner fault
argument, despite the support of LaGrand, is somewhat
problematic.

otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”); Stephen Blum, Public
Executions: Understanding the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” Clause, 19
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 451 (1992) (“[O]ne may not consent to cruel and
unusual punishment. For example, even if given the choice of punishments
between torture and death, the prisoner could not choose torture.”).
Even after LaGrand, legal scholars maintain this bedrock principle. See
Dale E. Ho, Silent at Sentencing: Waiver Doctrine and a Capital Defendant’s
Right to Present Mitigating Evidence After Schriro v. Landrigan, 62 FLA. L. REV.
721, 745 (2010) (“Given that, under the Eighth Amendment, the State has no
authority to impose certain penalties because those penalties are abhorrent to
society’s standard of decency, one could reasonably argue that a defendant
should not be permitted to invite the State to flout those standards.”);
Kirchmeier, supra note 330, at 643 (arguing that “waiver should not apply in
the context of the application of the Eighth Amendment to barbaric
punishments”); Mazzone, supra note 309, at 844 n.235 (“It is not difficult to
imagine other limitations on waiver . . . . [I]t is unlikely that a defendant could
agree—waiving Eighth Amendment protections—to be publicly flogged and then
drawn and quartered.”); Williams, supra note 309, at 720 (“We can start with an
easy proposition, that as a matter of intuition the state’s obligation not to inflict
inhumane punishment—notably torture—ought to be irrevocable and thus not
subject to waiver.”).
Elizabeth Rapaport applies this fundamental principle to the Lackey claim
context: “Perhaps for many of the condemned [on death row], periodic torture
would be preferable to certain and immediate death, but that does not render
torture plus death a sentence that would survive Eighth Amendment review.”
Elizabeth Rapaport, A Modest Proposal: The Aged on Death Row Should Be
Deemed Too Old to Execute, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1089, 1127 (2012).
354. According to Jones v. Chappell, execution following excessively lengthy
terms of death row incarceration is not merely arguably cruel and unusual
punishment but actually is cruel and unusual punishment. No. CV-09-01258CJC, 2014 WL 3567365, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2014) (“Allowing this system to
continue to threaten Mr. Jones with the slight possibility of death, almost a
generation after he was first sentenced, violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”).
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2. Waiver Cannot Make Death-Ineligible Capital Offenders
Eligible

In addition to it being unthinkable that waiver could allow
barbaric punishments like torture to be constitutional, it is also
unthinkable that waiver could allow categories of death-ineligible
capital offenders to become eligible for capital punishment.355
Kennedy v. Louisiana356 and Coker v. Georgia357 found execution
unconstitutional for the crime of rape. Would a rapist’s consent to
or choice of the death penalty make execution constitutional for
him? Roper v. Simmons358 and Thompson v. Oklahoma359 found
execution unconstitutional for juveniles and persons under the
age of sixteen, respectively.360 Would a fifteen-year-old’s consent
to or choice of the death penalty make it constitutional to execute
her? Ford v. Wainwright361 and Atkins v. Virginia362 found
execution unconstitutional for persons who are insane and
mentally retarded, respectively.363 Would such a cognitively
challenged person’s consent to or choice of capital punishment
make it constitutional to execute him? After the Supreme Court
in Furman v. Georgia364 declared capital punishment
355. See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide and
Competency, 103 MICH. L. REV. 939, 969 (2005) (arguing that a death-ineligible
defendant who waives his Eighth Amendment rights with suicidal motivation
should not be permitted to do so); Ho, supra note 353, at 745 n.120 (“The view
that the State has no authority to impose certain punishments, regardless of a
defendant’s consent, has found voice in the dissenting opinions of Justices
White, Brennan, and Marshall.”); Kirchmeier, supra note 330, at 650 (“[I]f, as
the Court implies in LaGrand, Johnson permits Eighth Amendment waivers,
then rape defendants, child defendants, and insane defendants could choose the
death penalty even though the Court has held that it violates the Eighth
Amendment to execute those categories of defendants.”).
356. 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (holding capital punishment unconstitutional
for the crime of rape of a child).
357. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding capital punishment unconstitutional
for the crime of rape of an adult).
358. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
359. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
360. Id. at 838; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
361. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
362. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
363. Id. at 321; Ford, 477 U.S. at 417–18.
364. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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unconstitutional as applied in 1972,365 but before the Court in
Gregg v. Georgia366 declared it conditionally constitutional in
1976,367 would any offender’s consent to or choice of execution
during that time period make it constitutional to execute her? As
to each of these questions, the answer is surely no. Allowing such
persons whom the Supreme Court has ruled the Eighth
Amendment categorically bars their execution to “waive into”
capital punishment is unthinkable. As a result, waiver of the
Eighth Amendment, at least in the capital punishment context, is
not absolute. That waiver of the Eighth Amendment is limited
may also limit the applicability of waiver in the Lackey claim
context.
3. Limiting LaGrand
Despite the possible troubling implications of LaGrand,
commentators have noted several reasons why it may not
establish a precedent undermining the fundamental principle
that defendants’ choice cannot transform cruel and unusual
punishment into constitutional punishment.368 First, the analysis
was “cursory” and the Court did not receive full briefing and oral
argument.369 Second, “the analysis and conclusion are dicta
because of the Court’s conclusion that the issue was procedurally

365. Id. at 239.
366. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
367. Id. at 153.
368. See Cutler, supra note 343, at 394 (“Several principles nonetheless
suggest weaknesses in LaGrand and provide hope for those challenging [the
constitutionality of a punishment consented to or chosen].”); Epstein, supra note
327, at 26 (“[LaGrand] avoided the [fundamental] issue, and LaGrand therefore
offers no limitation on the principle espoused here—that a person may not agree
to a punishment that is intolerable for society to impose.”); Kirchmeier, supra
note 330, at 642 (concluding that LaGrand “failed to fully resolve the choice
issue, and it remains open until the Court addresses the issue in a different
procedural posture”).
369. See Kirchmeier, supra note 330, at 640 (speculating that “[p]erhaps the
Court devoted little effort to the issue because of the time constraints dictated
by Walter LaGrand’s execution, which was scheduled for only hours after the
Court’s decision”).
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defaulted.”370 Third, in basing its waiver decision on the Teague
rule barring the application of new rules to habeas petitioners,
the Court suggests that it might reach a different result in a case
on direct appeal, rather than habeas, when Teague would not
apply.371 As a result, LaGrand may not seriously threaten the
fundamental principle that waiver cannot transform an
unconstitutional punishment into a constitutional punishment.
Thus, waiver as the underlying rationale of the prisoner fault
argument is less persuasive. As an arguably cruel and unusual
punishment, execution following death row incarceration for
upwards of thirty years or more cannot necessarily be made
constitutional on the basis of waiver.372
370. Id.
371. See Cutler, supra note 343, at 394 (“Removed from the strict habeas
prohibition against imposing a new constitutional requirement retroactively,
direct review would allow the Supreme Court to consider plenary arguments on
the issue.”); Epstein, supra note 327, at 26 (noting that the procedural posture of
the case was “significant”); Kirchmeier, supra note 330, at 640–42 (“[T]he Court
indicated that it could reach a different result if a case were to reach the Court
on a certiorari grant from a direct appeal rather than from habeas review and if
the issue were not defaulted.”); cf. Cutler, supra note 343, at 393 (“Essentially,
the Supreme Court found that the special rules of habeas review prevented
carving out an exception to the general rule of waiver for Eighth Amendment
claims.”).
372. One might object that LaGrand may be interpreted in a way that both
preserves waiver as a tenable basis for the prisoner fault argument and avoids
constitutionalizing paradigmatically unconstitutional punishments. The
interpretation is that LaGrand allows waiver regarding punishments that have
not been ruled by the Supreme Court to violate the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. This interpretation would
bar waiver regarding both torture and capital punishment (for classes of
offenders, like juveniles, who are categorically death ineligible) while still
allowing waiver regarding Lackey claims.
But a problem with this interpretation remains. It would still
constitutionalize novel, exotic forms of punishment that the Supreme Court has
yet to rule as cruel and unusual but that are no less torturous than those it has.
Consider, for example, being eaten alive by wild boar, or even new technologybased punishments that the Framers could not have envisioned—being burned
from the inside by an army of mini-laser-wielding nanobots. Under the
interpretation of LaGrand offered by the objection, these clearly cruel and
unusual punishments could be constitutionalized through waiver. One might
still object that the Supreme Court has already ruled these punishments
unconstitutional—they simply constitute torture. And as torture, the LaGrand
interpretation would bar such punishments from being constitutionalized via
waiver. But if so, then Lackey claimants could equally claim that execution
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4. Lackey Claimants Cannot Satisfy Waiver Standard
Even assuming that LaGrand cannot be limited and the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is fully subject to waiver, it is not clear that death
row prisoners asserting Lackey claims can effect a valid and legal
waiver. The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst,373 the very case
LaGrand cited as authority for its holding that the defendant
waived Eighth Amendment challenge to lethal gas as a cruel and
unusual punishment,374 held that waiver is the “intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”375
As Jason Mazzone explained, “waiver occurs when a person
possesses a right that she could exercise but she purposely
decides to relinquish it and does not exercise it.”376
This waiver standard raises two obstacles for Lackey
claimants to effect a valid and legal waiver. First, by seeking
appellate and collateral review, prisoners are not intentionally or
purposely relinquishing any Eighth Amendment protections.
Their only intent, or their direct intent, is to obtain appellate and
collateral review of their capital conviction and/or sentence so as
to avoid execution altogether. They either lack the intent
altogether or perhaps, in some cases, only have the indirect

following decades on death row incarceration is also torture (and thus not
subject to waiver).
To avoid the absurdity of clearly cruel and unusual punishments being
constitutionalized through waiver, one must adhere to the fundamental
principle that the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment cannot be waived with respect to types of punishment. Or it can
only be waived with respect to a punishment that the Supreme Court has
affirmatively stated is constitutional. On this basis, execution following decades
of death row incarceration cannot be immune from Eighth Amendment
challenge on the basis of waiver unless and until the Supreme Court
affirmatively rules on its constitutionality.
373. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
374. See Stewart v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115, 119 (1999) (per curiam) (stating
that the defendant, by selecting execution by lethal gas instead of lethal
injection, waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of execution by
lethal gas (citing Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464)).
375. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
376. Mazzone, supra note 309, at 804.
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intent to delay their execution. Thus they do not intentionally or
purposely relinquish any Eighth Amendment protections.377
Second, and more fundamentally, that which is being
relinquished must be a known legal right. But the right to an
expeditious execution is a right unknown to almost all courts.
Can prisoners effect a relinquishment of a known legal right that
is a right unknown to (i.e., unrecognized by) courts? It seems
incongruous for courts rejecting Lackey claims to do so on the
basis that prisoners have waived a right that the court itself
refuses to recognize. At present, the right to a timely execution is
neither a known legal right nor an existing legal right in any
jurisdiction save one.378 And because it is not an existing right, it
cannot be a right that the prisoner “possesses” and “could
exercise.”379 A prisoner cannot effect a valid waiver of a right that
is neither known nor existing.380
377. To see this point in a different way, contrast the Lackey claimant with a
defendant who is truly intentionally waiving a right. By pleading guilty a
defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to, among other things, a jury
trial. By pleading guilty, the defendant does truly intend to not have a jury trial.
By electing to self-represent, a defendant waives the Sixth Amendment right to
have counsel represent him. By self-representing, the defendant does truly
intend to not have another represent him. But merely by seeking appellate
and/or collateral review of a capital conviction or sentence, we cannot in the
same way conclude that such a defendant is waiving Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment for an excessively delayed
execution. By seeking such review, the defendant’s true and direct intent is to
reverse the conviction or sentence.
378. See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text (discussing Jones as the
first federal decision recognizing a Lackey claim).
379. Mazzone, supra note 309, at 804.
380. One might object that the Lackey claimant is not waiving the right,
under the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
against execution following a lengthy period of death row incarceration. Rather,
it is simply the right against cruel and unusual punishment that is being
waived. Because that right is obviously known and existing, a Lackey claimant
can easily meet the standard for a valid and legal waiver.
But the right being waived cannot be simply the right against cruel and
unusual punishment. To see this, consider the following hypothetical. Suppose a
death row prisoner asserts two claims. First, that execution following decades of
death row incarceration violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment (this is the familiar Lackey claim). Second, that
the execution alone violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment based on Furman v. Georgia, because, for example, it
is arbitrary. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310 (1972) (per curiam)
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Thus, even assuming that LaGrand cannot be limited, and
even assuming that the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is fully subject to waiver, Lackey claimants
may not be able to effect a valid and legal waiver. They are not
intentionally relinquishing the right, the right is not known, they
do not possess the right, and it is not a right they could exercise.
Consequently, waiver fails to supply a rationale for the prisoner
fault argument.
5. Waiver of Right Presupposes Existence of Right
The previous section argued that non-existent rights cannot
be waived. Because the right to an expeditious execution is nonexistent (in every jurisdiction but one), the right cannot be
waived (in any jurisdiction but one). This section makes
essentially the same argument but from the opposite direction.
Let us assume arguendo that Lackey claimants are legally
waiving the protection the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause extends to execution following
decades of death row incarceration. But the concept of waiver
implies that there is an underlying right that is being waived.
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“I simply conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal
systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly
imposed.”). Courts employing the prisoner fault argument based on a waiver
rationale would deny the first claim because the prisoner waived it. If the right
being waived was the entire right against cruel and unusual punishment that
would mean that the second claim can also be rejected on the basis of waiver.
However, there is no basis for the second claim to be denied based on waiver. No
court has ever ruled that, by seeking review of the arbitrariness of an execution,
the prisoner has waived the right against cruel and unusual punishment. Thus,
the right being waived with respect to the first claim is not the entire right
against cruel and unusual punishment. Courts denying Lackey claims are
merely ruling that the prisoner is barred from making Eighth Amendment
claims based on delay. They are not ruling that the prisoner has waived—
always and forever—the entire Eighth Amendment or the entire Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.
As a result, the right that courts denying Lackey claims are concluding that
prisoners have, in effect, waived is the right against execution following a
sufficiently lengthy period of death row incarceration. Because that right is
neither known nor existing (in every jurisdiction but one), the right cannot be
waived (in any jurisdiction but one).
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Waiver of a right presupposes and concedes the existence of that
right. As the Supreme Court stated in Zerbst, waiver is the
“intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege.”381 For a right to be both known and relinquished, as is
required for a legally valid waiver, it must exist. As Mazzone
similarly explained, “waiver occurs when a person possesses a
right that she could exercise but she purposely decides to
relinquish it and does not exercise it.”382 Thus, for there to be a
legally valid waiver, the person waiving the right must both
possess it and be capable of exercising it. For a right to be both
possessed and capable of being exercised, it must exist. As a
result, if the rationale of the prisoner fault argument is waiver,
then death row prisoners do have an Eighth Amendment right
against execution following a sufficiently lengthy term of death
row incarceration. But this is a right that no court rejecting a
Lackey claim has ever acknowledged. Reliance on waiver as the
rationale for the prisoner fault argument would force courts to
recognize a right the existence of which they have vehemently
denied.383
6. Justice Thomas Rejects Waiver Rationale
A final consideration militating against waiver supplying the
rationale for the prisoner fault argument is that Justice Thomas
may have explicitly rejected it. In Thompson v. McNeil,384 Justice
Thomas denied the prisoner’s Lackey claim by invoking the
prisoner fault argument, stating that a defendant cannot “‘avail
himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and
then complain when his execution is delayed.’”385 In his dissent,
Justice Breyer summarized Justice Thomas’s view as follows:
381. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
382. Mazzone, supra note 309, at 804.
383. See supra notes 53, 161–164 (presenting numerous examples of courts
denying the existence of a constitutional right associated with a Lackey claim).
384. 556 U.S. 1114 (2009).
385. Id. at 1117 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (quoting
Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari)).
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“Justice Thomas suggests that petitioner cannot now challenge
the constitutionality of the delay because much of that delay is
his own fault—he caused it by choosing to challenge the sentence
that the people of Florida deemed appropriate.”386 Justice Breyer
replied that the prisoner has not waived his Eighth Amendment
claim: “I do not believe that petitioner’s decision to exercise his
right to seek appellate review of his death sentence automatically
waives a claim that the Eighth Amendment proscribes a delay of
more than thirty years.”387 Justice Thomas replied to Breyer’s
argument as follows: “The issue is not whether a death-row
inmate’s appeals ‘waive’ any Eighth Amendment right; the issue
instead is whether the death-row inmate’s litigation strategy,
which delays his execution, provides a justification for the Court
to invent a new Eighth Amendment right. It does not.”388 By this
statement, Justice Thomas seemed to concede that a death row
prisoner seeking appellate and collateral review, and thereby
delaying his execution, is not waiving any Eighth Amendment
right. Instead, Justice Thomas believed that the issue is whether
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment protects against substantially delayed executions
and he declared that it does not.
Note that Justice Thomas argued that recognition of a
Lackey claim would require “the Court to invent a new Eighth
Amendment right.”389 Thus, the right, according to Justice
Thomas, does not presently exist within the Eighth Amendment.
Because non-existent rights cannot be waived, waiver fails as a
rationale for the prisoner fault argument.390 And the cost of the
waiver rationale succeeding would be the concession that the
right against execution following excessively lengthy death row
incarceration does presently exist and is presently protected by
the Eighth Amendment.391 That is, either waiver fails as a
386. Id. at 1120.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1117.
389. Id. (emphasis added).
390. See supra Part IV.C.4 (arguing that a Lackey claimant cannot satisfy
the waiver standard because the claimants are not “intentionally or purposely
relinquishing” a “known legal right”).
391. See supra Part IV.C.5 (arguing that waiver presupposes the existence of
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rationale or the cost of its success is acceptance of the very right
the existence of which Justice Thomas and the lower courts
vigorously deny.392 Either way, the possible rationale of waiver
for the prisoner fault argument is not helpful to Justice Thomas
and the lower courts denying Lackey claims.
V. Conclusion
The principal basis for courts rejecting claims that execution
following death row incarceration of upwards of thirty years or
more violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment (Lackey claims) is that such lengthy
delays between sentencing and execution are self-inflicted by the
prisoners. By choosing to pursue appellate and collateral review,
the resulting delays are the prisoners’ fault and thus cannot
violate the Eighth Amendment. Though utilized by nearly every
court addressing Lackey claims, the prisoner fault argument
lacks an underlying rationale tying it to the concerns of the
Eighth Amendment. This Article proposed the two most obvious
possible rationales—analogizing to the Sixth Amendment speedy
trial right and waiver—but neither proposed rationale is
persuasive. Even assuming that these proposed rationales do
make prisoner fault relevant, the price for purchasing this
relevance is the concession that the Eighth Amendment does
contain the very right that courts denying Lackey claims refuse to
recognize. Therefore, either prisoner fault for delay is irrelevant
and the prisoner fault argument is untenable or prisoner fault for
delay is relevant, but prisoners do have an Eighth Amendment
right against execution following an excessively lengthy period of
death row incarceration. Either way, the prisoner fault argument
should no longer be the primary obstacle to courts recognizing
Lackey claims.

a right to an expeditious execution).
392. See supra notes 53, 161–164 (citing numerous cases in which the
existence of a right to an expeditious execution is denied).

